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The Death of Privacy?
A. Michael Froonmkin*
The rapid deployment of privacy-destroying technologies by governments
and businesses threatens to make informational privacy obsolete. The first part
of this article describes a range of current technologies to which the law has yet
to respond effectively. These include: routine collection of transactional data,
growing automated surveillance in public places, deployment offacial recogni-
tion technology and other biometrics, cell-phone tracking, vehicle tracking, sat-
ellite monitoring, workplace surveillance, Internet tracking from cookies to
"clicktrails, " hardware-based identifiers, intellectual property-protecting
"snitchware," and sense-enhanced searches that allow observers to see
through everythingfrom walls to clothes. The cumulative and reinforcing effect
of these technologies may make modern life completely visible and permeable
to observers; there could be nowhere to hide. The second part of this article
discusses leading attempts to craft legal responses to the assault on privacy-
including self-regulation, privacy-enhancing technologies, data-protection law,
andproperty-rights based solutions-in the context of three structural obstacles
to privacy enhancement: consumers 'privacy myopia; important First Amend-
ment protection of rights to collect and repeat information; and fear of what
other people may do if not monitored. The article concludes that despite the
warnings ofinformationprivacypessimists, all is not lost-yet.
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"You have zero privacy. Get over it."
-Sun Mierosystems, Inc., CEO Scott McNealyt
INTRODUCTION
Information, as we all know, is power. Both collecting and collating
personal information are means of acquiring power, usually at the expense of
the data subject. Whether this is desirable depends upon who the viewer and
subject are and who is weighing the balance. It has long been believed, for
example, that the citizen's ability to monitor the state tends to promote hon-
1. Deborah Radcliff, A Cry for Privacy, COMPUTER WORLD, May 17, 1999 <http://wmv.
computerworld.com/hometprint.nsflall/990517privacy>. The comment was in response to a ques-
tion at a product launch. See also Edward C. Baig, Marcia Stepanek & Neil Gross, Privacy: The
Internet Wants Your Personal Info., Whiat's in It for You?, Bus. WK., Apr. 5, 1999, at 84 (quoting
McNealy as saying, "You already have zero privacy. Get over it.").
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est government, that "[s]unlight is... the best of disinfectants." 2 One need
look no further than the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
to be reminded that protecting the acquisition and dissemination of informa-
tion is an essential means of empowering citizens in a democracy. Con-
versely, at least since George Orwell's 1984, if not Bentham's Panopticon,
the image of the all-seeing eye, the Argus state, has been synonymous with
the power to exercise repression. Today, the all-seeing eye need not neces-
sarily belong to the government, as many in the private sector find it valuable
to conduct various forms of surveillance or to "mine" data collected by oth-
ers. For example, employers continually seek new ways to monitor employ-
ees for efficiency and honesty; firms trawl databases for preference
information in the search for new customers. Even an infrequently exercised
capability to collect information confers power on the potential observer at
the expense of the visible: Knowing you may be watched affects behavior.
Modem social science confirms our intuition that people act differently when
they know they are on Candid Camera-or Big Brother Cam.3
In this article, I will use "informational privacy" as shorthand for the
ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself.4 I
will argue that both the state and the private sector now enjoy unprecedented
abilities to collect personal data, and that technological developments sug-
gest that costs of data collection and surveillance will decrease, while the
quantity and quality of data will increase. I will also argue that, when possi-
ble, the law should facilitate informational privacy because the most effec-
tive way of controlling information about oneself is not to share it in the first
place.
Most of this article focuses on issues relating to data collection and not
data collation. Much of the best work on privacy, and the most comprehen-
sive legislation,5 while not ignoring issues of data collection nonetheless fo-
2. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
Brandeis actually intended this comment to include both public and private institutions: "Publicity
is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Id.
3. See KARL G. HEIDER, ETHNOGRAPHIc FILM 11-15, 49-62 (1976) (discussing ways in
which the act of filming may distort or misrepresent reality); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF
THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER 344-45 (1988) (describing the phe-
nomenon of "anticipatory conformity" among persons who believe they are being observed). Cf
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965) (noting that it is "highly probable" that the presence of
cameras in the courtroom will influence jurors).
4. The definition differs from that used in United States constitutional law. The constitutional
right to privacy is frequently described as having three components: (1) a right to be left alone; (2)
a right to autonomous choice regarding intimate matters; and (3) a right to autonomous choice re-
garding other personal matters. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMI.R!CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-
1 (2d ed. 1988); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years ofPrivacy, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 1335, 1340.
5. The European Union's Privacy Directive, Council Directive 95/46 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, is probably the most compre-
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cuses on issues relating to the storage and reuse of data. Privacy-enhancing
legal and policy analysis often proceeds on the reasonable theory that be-
cause the most serious privacy-related consequences of data acquisition hap-
pen after the fact, and require a database, the use and abuse of databases is
the appropriate focus for regulation. This article concentrates on the logi-
cally prior issue of data collection. Issues of data use and re-use cannot be
avoided, however, because one of the ways to reduce data collection is to
impose limits on the use of improperly collected data. Conversely, if limits
on initial data collection are constitutional, then it is more likely that efforts
to prohibit the retransmission or republishing of illicitly collected data would
be held to be constitutional as well.
A data subject has significantly less control over personal data once in-
formation is in a database. The easiest way to control databases, therefore, is
to keep information to oneself: If information never gets collected in the first
place, database issues need never arise. It may be that "[tlhree can keep a
secret-if two of them are dead,"6 but in the world of the living we must find
kinder, gentler solutions. Although privacy-enhancing technologies such as
encryption provide a limited ability to protect some data and communica-
tions from prying eyes and ears, it seems obvious that total secrecy of this
sort is rarely a practical possibility today unless one lives alone in a cabin in
the woods. One must be photographed and fill out a questionnaire to get a
driver's license, show ID to get a job.? Our homes are permeable to sense-
enhanced snooping; our medical and financial data is strewn around the da-
tasphere; our communications are easily monitored; our lives are an open
book to a mildly determined detective. Personal lives are becoming in-
creasingly transparent to governments, interested corporations, and even to
one another-as demonstrated by notorious incidents of phone eavesdrop-
ping or taping involving diverse individuals such as Britain's Prince Charles,
House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and White House Intern Monica Lewinsky.
hensive attempt to protect informational privacy, although experts disagree about its domestic and
especially extraterritorial effects. Compare PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERO, DATA
PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF U.S. DATA PROTECTION (1996), with PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E.
LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE
EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998).
6. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANAC (1735), reprinted in THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 211 (2d ed. 1959).
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(B) (1996) (prohibiting hiring workers without verifying identity
and authorization to work in the United States). Employers must complete an INS Form 1-9, Em-
ployment Eligibility Verification Form, documenting this verification and stating the type of II)
they examined. See Verification of Employment Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 (1999).
8. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing the taping of a
cell phone call including Speaker Gingrich); OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, REFERRAL
TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES
CODE, § 595(C) § LB.3 ("The Starr Report") <httpi/icreporloc.gov/icreport/6narithtmL7> (de-
scribing recording of Lewinsky calls by Linda Tripp); Paul Vallely, The Queen Brings Down 7he
1464 [Vol. 52:1461
THE DEATH OF PRIVACY?4
This general trend is driven by technological innovation and by economic
and social forces creating a demand for privacy-destroying technologies.
When solitude is not an option, personal data will be disclosed 'voluntarily'
for transactions or emitted by means beyond our control. What remains to be
determined is which legal rules should govern the collection as well as the
use of this information.
In light of the rapid growth of privacy-destroying technologies, it is in-
creasingly unclear whether informational privacy can be protected at a bear-
able cost, or whether we are approaching an era of zero informational
privacy, a world of what Roger Clarke calls "dataveillance." 9 Part I of this
article describes a number of illustrative technological developments that
facilitate the collection of personal data. Collectively these and other devel-
opments provide the means for the most overwhelming assault on informa-
tional privacy in the recorded history of humankind. That surveillance
technologies threaten privacy may not be breaking news, but the extent to
which these technologies will soon allow watchers to permeate modem life
still has the power to shock. Nor is it news that the potential effect of citizen
profiling is vastly increased by the power of information processing and the
linking of distributed databases. We are still in the early days of data min-
ing, consumer profiling, and DNA databasing, to name only a few. The cu-
mulative and accelerating effect of these developments, however, has the
potential to transform modem life in all industrialized countries. Unless
something happens to counter these developments, it seems likely that soon
all but the most radical privacy freaks may live in the informational equiva-
lent of a goldfish bowl.1O
If the pace at which privacy-destroying technologies are being devised
and deployed is accelerating, the basic phenomenon is nevertheless old
enough already to have spawned a number of laws and proposed legal or so-
cial solutions designed to protect or enhance privacy in various ways. Part II
of this article examines several of these proposed privacy enhancing policies
in light of the technologies discussed in Part I. It suggests that some will be
Shutters, THE INDEP., Aug. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10952752 (noting the taping of inti-
mate conversation of Prince Charles).
Although the phenomenon ofad hoc surveillance and eavesdropping is an interesting one, this
article concentrates on more organized corporate and government surveillance and especially pro-
filing.
9. See Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498 (May
1988) (defining dataveillance as "the systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or
monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons") <http'//www.anu.edu.au/
people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM88.html>.
10. So-called "reality" television programming provides a possible glimpse of this world.
The popularity of these shows demonstrates the supply of willing watchers, and there appear to be
many willing subjects. See, e.g., Associated Press, Actress Bares All in Santiago Glass House,
CNN.CoM, Jan. 26, 2000 <http:/cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americaslOl1/26/chile.glass.house.apt>
(describing actress "spending two weeks in a house in central Santiago made of nothing but glass").
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ineffective, that others will have undesirable or unconstitutional effects, and
that even the best will protect only a narrow range of privacy on their own.
The relative weakness of current privacy-enhancing strategies sets the
stage for the conclusion of the article, which challenges the latest entry to the
privacy debate-the counsel of despair epitomized by Scott McNealy's sug-
gestion that the battle for privacy was lost almost before it was waged. Al-
though there is a disturbingly strong case supporting this view, a case made
trenchantly by David Brin's The Transparent Society," I conclude by sug-
gesting that all is not yet lost. While there may be no single tactic that suf-
fices to preserve the status quo, much less regain lost privacy, a smorgasbord
of creative technical and legal approaches could make a meaningful stand
against what otherwise seems inevitable.
A focus on informational privacy may seem somewhat crabbed and lim-
ited. Privacy, after all, encompasses much more than just control over a data
trail, or even a set of data. It encompasses ideas of bodily and social auton-
omy, of self-determination, and of the ability to create zones of intimacy and
inclusion that define and shape our relationships with each other. Control
over personal information is a key aspect of some of these ideas of privacy,
and is alien to none of them. On the other hand, given that we live in an age
of ubiquitous social security numbers,12 not to mention televised public talk-
show confessionals and other forms of media-sanctioned exhibitionism and
voyeurism,13 it may seem reactionary to worry about informational privacy.
11. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998).
12. See, e.g., U.S. GAO, GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIAL USE OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBER IS WIDESPREAD 1 (1999) (Letter Report, GAOIHEHS-99-28) <http:llfrwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.88&filenan-e=he99028.pdf&directory=-/diskb/
wais/data/gao> (noting "the SSN is used for a myriad of non-Social Security purposes, some legal
and some illegal"); Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and
Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 L MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 535 (1998) ("SSN use is so important to business and government in
this country that a person who is assertive about their privacy rights may find herself in a position in
which another will refuse to do business with her unless she furnishes her SSN.').
13. The phenomenon is everywhere, from the Starr Report to confessional talk shows, from
mainstream films to the Intemet's 24x7 webeams. Cf HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL
MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 74-81 (1964) (warning of
"repressive desublimation" in which capitalism absorbs sexuality, strips it of threat and danger,
drains it of its original meaning, repackages it as a commodity, then sells it back to the masses); see
also Anita L. Allen, Privacy and 7he Public Offici alking About Sex as a Dilemma For Democ-
racy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1165 (1999) (noting that public servants now believe that
"what takes place in private, unless dull and routine, is likely to become public knowledge any-
way"); Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 17 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.L 273, 274 (1999) (arguing for First Amendment right to "to peer and to gaze into places
from which we are typically forbidden, and to facilitate our ability to see and to hear the innermost
details of others' lives without fear of legal repercussion"); Andrew Leonard, Microsoft.org',
SALON, July 21, 1998 <htip:llwwv.salon.com2lstlfeaturel1998/07/Cov_21feature.html> (describ-
ing how exhibitionists turned the Microsoft NetMeeting server, which provides means for PC cam
video conferencing, into "a 24-hour international sex orgy").
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It also may be that mass privacy is a recent invention, rarely experienced be-
fore the nineteenth century save in the hermitage or on the frontier.14 Per-
haps privacy is a luxury good by world standards, and right-thinking people
should concentrate their energies on more pressing matters, such as war,
famine, or pestilence. And perhaps it really is better to be watched, and the
benefits of mass surveillance and profiling outweigh the costs. Nevertheless,
in this article I will assume that informational privacy is a good in itself,is
and a value worth protecting, 6 although not at all costs.17
14. The extent to which modem ideas of privacy have historic roots is open to debate. While
the distinction between the "private" home and the "public" outside is presumed to be ancient, see
JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 4 (1962), it is
clear the conception of the home has changed. Peter Ackroyd's description of the home of Sir
Thomas Moore, for example, with its numbers of servants, retainers, and even a fool, bears little
relation to the home life of even the modem rich. See PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAs
MOORE 255-56 (1998). And, of course, one would not expect a concern with informational privacy
in its modem form to predate the privacy-destroying technologies, mass data storage, or modem
data-processing to which it is a reaction.
15. This article thus does not consider suggestions arising from law and economics that pri-
vacy is best understood as a mere intermediate good. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy,
12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978). Treating privacy as an intermediate good, then-Professor Posner
concluded that personal privacy is generally inefficient, because it allows persons to conceal dis-
reputable facts about themselves and to shift costs of information acquisition (or the cost of failing
to acquire information) to those who are not the least-cost avoiders. Data concealment by busi-
nesses is generally efficient, however, since allowing businesses to conceal trade secrets and other
forms of intellectual property will tend to spur innovation. See id. Useful correctives to Posner's
views include KiM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COM-
MION LAWV 43-53, 111-26 (1988); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright,
Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1443-57, 1471-77 (1992), and
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy Is Dear at Any Price: A Response to Professor Posner's Economic
Theory, 12 GA. L. REv. 429 (1978).
16. Readers needing persuasion on this point should consult Part I ofJerry Kang, Information
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-20 (1998).
"In a Wall Street Joumal/NBC News poll last fall, Americans were given a list of eight con-
ccrns that might face them in the new century and were asked to rank the ones that worry them the
mosL Loss of personal privacy ranked at the top of the list, cited by 29%." See also Glenn R.
Simpson, E-Connnerce Firms Start to Rethink Opposition to Privacy Regulation as Abuses, Anger
Rise, WALL ST. 3., Jan. 6, 2000, at A24. In a recent survey, 80% of United States residents, 68% of
Britons, and 79% of Germans polled agreed strongly or somewhat with the assertion that "consum-
ers have lost all control over how personal information is collected and used by companies"; how-
ever, 59%, 63%, and 55% of Americans, Britons, and Germans respectively also agreed that
existing laws and organization practices in the their country provide a reasonable level of consumer
privacy protection. IBM, IBM MULTI-NATIONAL CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY 22 (1999)
<http://ibm.com/services/files/privacysurveyoct991.pdf>. In a different survey, 92% of Canadi-
ans expressed some concern, and 52% were "extremely concerned" about privacy. John D.R.
Craig, Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Conmion-Law Tort Awakens, 42 MCGILL LJ.
355,357 (1997).
17. Due to limitations of space, and of my knowledge, this article also adopts an artificially
United States-centric focus, although the problems discussed here are of global importance.
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I. PRIVACY-DESTROYING TECHNOLOGIES
Privacy-destroying technologies can be divided into two categories:
those that facilitate the acquisition of raw data and those that allow one to
process and collate that data in interesting ways. Although both real and use-
ful, the distinction can be overstated because improvements in information
processing also make new forms of data collection possible. Cheap compu-
tation makes it easy to collect and process data on the keystrokes per minute
of clerks, secretaries, and even executives. It also makes it possible to
monitor their web browsing habits.18 Cheap data storage and computation
also makes it possible to mine the flood of new data, creating new informa-
tion by the clever organization of existing data.
Another useful taxonomy would organize privacy-destroying technolo-
gies by their social context. One could focus on the characteristics of indi-
viduals about whom data is being gathered (e.g., citizen, employee, patient,
driver, consumer). Or, one could focus instead on the different types of ob-
servers (e.g., intelligence agencies, law enforcement, tax authorities, insur-
ance companies, mall security, e-commerce sites, concerned parents, crazed
fans, ex-husbands, nosy neighbors). At the most basic level, initial observers
can be broadly categorized as either governmental or private, although here
too the importance of the distinction can be overstated, because private par-
ties often have access to government databases and governments frequently
purchase privately collected data. There are some types of data collection
that only the government can undertake, for example, the capture of infor-
mation on legally mandated forms such as the census, driver's licenses, or
tax returns. But even these examples illustrate the danger of being too cate-
gorical: some states make driver's license data and even photographs avail-
able for sale or search, and many tax returns are filed by commercial
preparers (or web-based forms), giving a third party access to the data.
Databases multiply the effects of sensors. For example, cameras have a
far less intrusive effect on privacy if their only use is to be monitored in real
time by operators watching for commission of crimes. The longer the tapes
are archived, the greater their potential effect. And, the more that the tapes
can be indexed according to who and what they show rather than just where
and when they were made, the more easily the images can be searched or
18. Employers' concern about "cyberslackers" is fanned by consultants' reports that "em-
ployees who surf the web from their office PCs are costing Corporate America more than SI billion
a year." Michele Masterson, Cyberveillance at Work: Surfing the Wrong Internet Sites on the Job
Could Get You Fired, CNN.coM, Jan. 4, 2000 <http:llwww.cnnfn.com/2O000l/04/technology/
webspy/>; cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton
Administration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2000) (arguing that sexual hostile envi-
ronment harassment law is now so pervasive and potentially hair-trigger that prudent employer
must carefully monitor workplace, including Internet use, for employee access of sexually themed
materials).
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integrated into personal profiles. Equally important, databases make it pos-
sible to create new information by combining existing data in new and inter-
esting ways. Once created or collected, data is easily shared and hard to
eradicate; the data genie does not go willingly, if ever, back into the bottle.
Reams of data organized into either centralized or distributed databases
can have substantial consequences beyond the simple loss of privacy caused
by the initial data collection, especially when subject to advanced correlative
techniques such as data mining.19 Among the possible harmful effects are
various forms of discrimination, ranging from price discrimination to more
invidious sorts of discrimination.20 Data accumulation enables the construc-
tion of personal data profiles.21 When the data are available to others, they
can construct personal profiles for targeted marketing,22 and even, in rare
cases, blackmail.23 For some, just knowing that their activities are being re-
19. See ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. AND PRIVACY COMM'R/ONTARIO DATA MINING: STAKING
A CLAIM ON YOUR PRIVACY (1998) <http:l/www.ipc.on.ca/website.englmatters/sumpap/
PAPERS/datamine.htm>:
Data mining is a set of automated techniques used to extract buried or previously un-
known pieces ofinformation from large databases. Successful data mining makes it possible
to unearth patterns and relationships, and then use this "new" information to make proactive
knowledge-driven business decisions. Data mining then, "centres on the automated discovery
of new facts and relationships in data. The raw material is the business data, and the data
mining algorithm is the excavator, sifting through the vast quantities of raw data looking for
the valuable nuggets of business information."
Data mining is usually used for four main purposes: (1) to improve customer acquisition
and retention; (2) to reduce fraud; (3) to identify internal inefficiencies and then revamp op-
erations[;] and (4) to map the unexplored terrain of the Internet. The primary types of tools
used in data mining are: neural networks, decision trees, rule induction, and data visualization.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting JOSEPH P. BIGUS, DATA MINING WITH NEURAL NETwORKS 9
(1996)).
20. See OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT 91 (1993); Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legiti-
mate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry into the Status ofPrivacy in Cyberspace, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77.
21. See Kang, supra note 16, at 1239.
22. See Jeff Severn, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personalhitformation, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 (1999):
[Ylou can buy lists of people who have bought skimpy swimwear; college students sorted by
major, class year, and tuition payment; millionaires and their neighbors; people who have lost
loved ones; men who have bought fashion underwear, women who have bought wigs; callers
to a 900-number national dating service; rocket scientists; children who have subscribed to
magazines or have sent in rebate forms included with toys; people who have had their urine
tested; medical malpractice plaintiffs; workers' compensation claimants; people who have
been arrested; impotent middle-aged men; epileptics; people with bladder-control problems;
buyers of hair removal products or tooth whiteners; people with bleeding gums; high-risk
gamblers; people who have been rejected for bank cards; and tenants who have sued landlords.
There are lists based on ethnicity, political opinions, and sexual orientation.
23. See Phil Agre, RRE Notes and Recommendations, RED ROCK EATER NEWS SERVICE,
Dec. 26, 1999 <http:llcommons.somewhere.comlrre1999/RRE.notes.and.recommendal4.html>:
Go to a part of town where your kind isn't thought to belong and you'll end up on a list
somewhere. Attend a political meeting and end up on another list. Walk into a ritzy boutique
and the clerk will have your credit report and purchase history before even saying hello ....
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corded may have a chilling effect on conduct,24 speech, and reading.25 Cus-
tomers may find it discomfiting to discover that a salesperson knows their
income or indebtedness, or other personal data.
When the government has access to the data, it not only gains powerful
investigative tools allowing it to plot the movements, actions, and financial
activities of suspects, 26 but it also gains new techniques for detecting crimes
and identifying suspects. 27 Ultimately, if data is collected on everyone's
location and on all transactions, it should be possible to achieve perfect law
enforcement, a world in which no transgression goes undetected and, per-
haps, unpunished.28 At that point, the assumptions of imperfect detection,
The whole culture will undergo convulsions as taken-for-granted assumptions about the con-
struction of personal identity in public places suddenly become radically false. ...
And that's just the start. Wait a little while, and a market will arise in "spottings": if I
want to know where you've been, I'1l have my laptop put out a call on the Interet to find out
who has spotted you. Spottings will be bought and sold in automated auctions, so that I can
build the kind of spotting history I need for the lowest cost. Entrepreneurs will purchase spot-
tings in bulk to synthesize spotting histories for paying customers. Your daily routine will be
known to anyone who wants to pay five bucks for it, and your movement history will deter-
mine your fate just as much as your credit history does now....
Then things will really get bad. Personal movement records will be subpoenaed, irregu-
larly at first, just when someone has been kidnapped, but then routinely, as every divorce law-
yer in the country reasons that subpoenas are cheap and not filing them is basically
malpractice. Then, just as we're starting to get used to this, a couple of people will get killed
by a nut who [has] been predicting their movements using commercially available movement
patterns.
24. Data mining can be used to generate lists of political preferences. Senator John McCain
and Texas Governor George W. Bush each contracted with Aristotle Publishing <http:ll
www.Aristo.org>, a firm that offered to target web users by matching web browsing habits and web
site signup data with voter registration records. See Lauren Weinstein, Web Tracking and Data
Matching Hit the Campaign Trail, PRIVACY FORUM DIGEST, Dec. 24, 1999 <http./w, w.vortex.coml
privacy/priv.08.22>.
25. Of course, disclosure also helps prevent evils that can hide behind the veil of anonymity.
See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymiy, Digi-
tal Cash, andDistributedDatabases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395,404-07,410-11 (1996).
26. See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), FINCEN FOLLOWS THE
MONEY: A LOCAL APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING & TRACKING CRIMINAL PROCEEDS 5 (1999)
<http://vww.treas.gov/fincenifollowme.pdf>. Approximately 200 staffers plus 40 "long-term de-
tailees" from 21 other regulatory and law enforcement agencies use financial, law enforcement, and
commercial databases to operate FinCEN. See id. at 3. Working with foreign "financial intelli-
gence units," FinCEN formed the "Egmont Group," an international cooperation designed to ex-
change information and expertise. See id. at 6.
27. See FinCEN, HELPING INVESTIGATORS USE THE MONEY TRAIL <http://www.treas.gov
fincen/follow2.html>; see also FinCEN, supra note 26, at 5 (stating that analysts may provide in-
formation through FinCEN's Artificial Intelligence System on previously undetected possible
criminal organizations and activities so that investigations can be initiated).
28. See, eg., David Cay Johnston, New Tools for the I.LS. to Sniff Out Tax Cheats, NY
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2000 <http:llwww.nytimes.comlOOl/llO3newsffmanciallis-tax.html> ("The [data
mining] technology ... being developed for the I.R.S.... will be able to feed data from every entry
on every tax return, personal or corporate, through filters to identify patterns of taxpayer conduct.
Those taxpayers whose returns suggest ... that they are highly likely to owe more taxes could then
quickly be sorted out and their tax returns audited."); see also Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal
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the need for deterrence, and the reliance on police and prosecutorial discre-
tion on which our legal system is based will come under severe strain.
A further danger is that the government or others will attempt to use the
ability to construct personal profiles in order to predict dangerous or antiso-
cial activities before they happen. People whose profiles meet the criteria
vill be flagged as dangerous and perhaps subjected to increased surveillance,
searches, or discrimination. Profiling is currently used to identify airline
passengers who the profilers think present an above-average risk of being
terrorists.29 In the wake of the tragedy at Colombine, schools are turning to
profiling to assess children for potential violence.30 In a world where such
profiling is common, who will dare to act in a way that will cause red flags to
fly?
In a thorough survey, Roger Clarke suggested that the collection and
collation of large amounts of personal data create many dangers at both the
individual and societal levels, including:
Dangers of Personal Dataveillance
lack of subject knowledge of data flows
blacklisting
Dangers of Mass Dataveillance
To the Individual
witch hunts
ex-ante discrimination and guilt prediction
selective advertising
inversion of the onus of proof
covert operations
unknown accusations and accusers
Surveillance in an Information Age Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?,
34 JtIRIMErRICS. 383,400-01 (1994) (discussing FinCEN and possible privacy problems).
29. Air travelers are profiled by a $2.8 billion monitoring system that uses a secret algorithm
to compare their personal data to profiles of likely terrorists. See Declan McCullagh, You? A Ter-
rorist? Yes!, WIRED, Apr. 20, 1999 <http:llwww.wired.comlnewslnews/politics/story/19218.html>
The CAPS [computer-assisted passenger screening] system operates off the computer reserva-
tion systems utilized by the major United States air carriers as well as some smaller carriers.
The CAPS system relies solely on information that passengers presently provide to air carriers
for reasons unrelated to security. It does not depend on the gathering of any additional infor-
mation from air travelers, nor is it connected to any law enforcement or intelligence database.
Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the United States, 64 Fed. Reg. 19220, 19222
(1999) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 108) (proposed Apr. 19, 1999).
30. Examples of this profiling in the wake of the Columbine shootings include a psychologi-
cal tool being offered by the FBI to identify "potentially violent" schoolchildren, see Jon Katz, Take
the FBIs Geek Profile Test, SLASHDOT, Nov. 29, 1999 <http'/slashdotorglfeatures/99/11/23/
1712222.shtnl>, and Mosaic-2000, a profiling tool developed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms, see Frances X. Clines, Computer Project Seeks to Avert Youth Violence, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1999. See also Software to Predict "Troubled Youths," SLASHDOT, Oct. 24, 1999
<http:/slashdot.orglyro/99/10/24/1147256.shtml> (open discussion of Mosaic-2000); Gavin de




denial of due process
To Society
prevailing climate of suspicion
adversarial relationships
focus of law enforcement on easily detectable and provable offences
inequitable application of the law
stultification of originality
increased tendency to opt out of the official level of society
weakening of society's moral fibre and cohesion
repressive potential for a totalitarian government31
There is little reason to believe that the nosiness of neighbors, employ-
ers, or governments has changed recently. What is changing very rapidly,
however, is the cost and variety of tools available to acquire personal data.
The law has done such a poor job of keeping pace with these developments
that some people have begun to suggest that privacy is becoming impossible.
A. Routinized Low-Tech Data Collection
Large quantities of personal data are routinely collected in the United
States today without any high-tech equipment. Examples include the collec-
tion of personal data by the Federal Government for taxes and the census,
data collected by states as a condition of issuing driver's licenses, and the
vast amounts of data collected by the private sector in the course of selling
products and services.
I. By the United States government.
The most comprehensive, legally mandated United States government
data collections are the annual collection of personal and corporate tax data,
and the decennial census. Both of these data collection activities are pro-
tected by unusually strict laws designed to prevent the release of personally
identifiable data.32 Other government data collection at the federal and state
31. Clarke, supra note 9.
32. See 13 U.S.C.A. §§ 8-9 (West Supp. 1999) (census); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (West Supp.
1999) (tax return data). Despite these rules, however, there have been suggestions that because
census information is detailed, it could be cross-indexed with other data to identify individuals. For
example, if one knows that there is only one person in a particular age group, of a particular ethnic-
ity, or with some other distinguishing characteristic within the census tract, and one can extract the
"aggregate" data for all individuals with the characteristic in the area, one has individualized the
data. Cf. Robert G. Schwartz, Jr., Privacy In German Employment Law, 15 HASTINGS IN'L &
COMP. L. REV. 135, 146 (1992) (describing 1983 decision of German Federal Constitutional court
striking down census questions that it believed would allow identification of respondents).
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level is either formally optional, or aimed at subsets of the population. Some
of these subsets, however, are very large.33
Anyone who takes a new job must be listed in the "new hires directory"
designed to support the Federal Parent Locator Service.34 This growing na-
tional database of workers enables courts to enforce court-ordered child sup-
port against working parents who are not making their support payments.
Each state has its own database, which is coordinated by the Office of Child
Support Enforcement within the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices.35 Anyone receiving public assistance is likely to be in a state main-
tained database of aid recipients. Federal, state, and local governments also
collect data from a total of about fifteen million arrestees each year.36 The
government continues to collect (and publish) data about some convicts even
after they have served their sentences. 37
License applications are formally optional data collections that have
wide application-licenses are optional, but if one wants a license, one must
answer the required questions. Perhaps the most widespread data collection
comes from driver's license applications, as most of the United States adult
population hold driver's licenses, at least outside the few major cities with
efficient mass transportation networks. In addition to requesting personal
data such as address, telephone number, and basic vital statistics, some states
collect health-related information, and all require a (frequently digitized)
photograph.
2. Transactional data.
Any personal transaction involving money, be it working, buying, sell-
ing, or investing, tends to create a data set relating to the transaction. Unless
the payment is in cash, the data set usually includes some personal data about
the individual(s) involved in the transaction.
Financial data collection is an interesting example of the private sector
collecting data for mixed motives. A single firm, Acxiom, now holds per-
33. See generally Lillian R. Bevier, Infonnation About Individuals in the Hands of Govern-
mer:!: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455
(1995) (discussing government's use of data provided by citizens).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1996).
35. See Department of Health and Human Services, What is NECSRS? <http://
ocse.aef.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/Navigation/QuestionsQues.htm#NECSRSI> (stating that the "Na-
tional Electronic Child Support Resource System ... is used to identify and electronically index
Federal, State, and local resource materials").
36. See Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"), Reno Proposes National DNA Da-
tabase, EPIC ALERT, Mar. 4, 1999 <http.lvww.epic.orgtalertIEPICAlert_6.04.html>.
37. See Megan's Law, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (West 1999) (registration of sex of-
fenders); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.




sonal and financial information about almost every United States, United
Kingdom, and Australian consumer.38 In many cases, banks and other finan-
cial service providers collect information about their clients because the data
has commercial value. In other cases, they record data because the govern-
ment requires them to make routine reports to assist law enforcement efforts.
In effect, private banks often act as agents of state data collection efforts.
Until machines for tracking bills by their serial numbers become much
more common than today, cash payment will remain relatively anonymous.
In their quest to gather personal data about customers, merchants have turned
to loyalty reward programs, such as frequent shopper cards and grocery club
cards. Depending upon the sophistication of the card, and of the system of
which it is a part, these loyalty programs can allow merchants to amass de-
tailed information about their customers.
Large amounts of cash trigger reporting requirements, which in turn
means that financial intermediaries must collect personal data from their
customers. Anti-money laundering laws (and sometimes tax laws) require
financial service providers to file reports on every suspicious transaction and
every time a client deposits, withdraws, or transfers $10,000 or more. Some
firms, often chosen because of their location in neighborhoods thought by
law enforcement to be high drug trading zones, must report transactions in-
volving as little as $750 in cash.39
Alternatives to cash, such as checks, debit cards, and credit cards, create
a data trail that identifies the purchaser, the merchant, the amount of the sale,
and sometimes the goods or services sold.
Whether replacing paper cash with electronic cash would make transac-
tions more secure and anonymous or create a digital data trail linking every
transaction to the parties involved depends entirely on how such an elec-
tronic cash system is designed. Both extremes are possible, as are intermedi-
ate designs in which, for example, the identity of the payer is not recorded
(or even identifiable), but the payee is known to the bank that issued the
electronic cash40 Because there* is currently no standard for electronic cash
and relatively little e-cash in circulation, anything remains possible.
Large quantities of medical data are generated and recorded during any
sustained interaction with the United States health care system. In addition
to being shared among various health care providers, the information is also
38. See Ian Grayson, Packer Sets up Big Brother Data Store, AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 30, 1999
<http://technology.news.com.au/news!4277059.htm>.
39. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, 1997-1998 REPORT ON MONEY
LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 28 <http://www.ustreas.gov/fincen/typo97en.htmIl> (noting imposition
of Geographic Targeting Orders pursuant to Banking Secrecy Act that required certain money
transmitters to report all cash transfers to Columbia of over $750 during 360-day period).
40. See Froomkin, supra note 25, at 449-79.
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shared with the entities that administer the system.41 Under the "Adminis-
trative Simplification" provision of the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"),42 standards are being developed to
facilitate the electronic transfer of health-related personal data. HIPPA re-
quires that all health information be kept in electronic form and that each
individual be given a unique health identifier to index the data.
Thus, even without high technology, substantial amounts of personal
data are routinely collected about almost everyone in the country. The intro-
duction of new technologies, however, promises to raise the quantity and
nature of the information that could be collected to new, somewhat dizzying,
heights.
B. Ubiquitous Surveillance
Unless social, legal, or technical forces intervene, it is conceivable that
there will be no place on earth where an ordinary person will be able to avoid
surveillance. In this possible future, public places will be watched by terres-
trial cameras and even by satellites. Facial and voice recognition software,
cell phone position monitoring, smart transport, and other science-fiction-
like developments will together provide full and perhaps real time informa-
tion on everyone's location. Homes and bodies will be subject to sense-
enhanced viewing. All communications, save perhaps some encrypted mes-
sages, will be scannable and sortable. Copyright protection "snitchware"43
and Internet-based user tracking will generate full dossiers of reading and
shopping habits. The move to web-based commerce, combined with the
41. As a result, health care related data will be part of a giant distributed database. See gener-
ally Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1997); Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND.
L. REv. 295 (1995); Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 707 (1987); see also U.S. GAO, MEDICALRECORDS PRIVACY: ACCESs NEEDED FORHEALTH
RESEARCH, BUT OVERSIGHT OF PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IS LIMITED, GAO/HEHS-99-55 (1999)
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-binlgetdoe.cgi?dbname=gao&docid--fhe99055.txtpdf>.
HHS is expected to issue medical privacy regulations by February 21, 2000, defining rules for
the security and disclosure of health care data. The draft regulations allow disclosure of health
information without an individual's authorization for research, public health, oversight, and some
other purposes; otherwise written authorization is required. Databases must be kept secure. Col-
lectors of medical data must conform to fair information practices, inform people how their infor-
mation is used and disclosed, and ensure that people can view information being held about them.
The draft rules propose that their protections would attach as soon as information is "electronic"
and run with the information as long as the information is in the hands of a covered entity. The
proposed rules do not, however, apply to downstream recipients of medical data. See NPRM HI-IS,
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918 (1999),
<http:llaspe.hhs.govladmnsimp/pvcnprm.pdf> (technical corrections available in <http.//aspe.hhs.gov/
admnsimp/nprm/99l2l5fr.pdf>).
42. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1320d- 2).
43. See note 110 infra and accompanying text
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fight against money laundering and tax evasion, will make it possible to as-
semble a complete economic profile of every consumer. All documents,
whether electronic, photocopied, or (perhaps) even privately printed, will
have invisible markings making it possible to trace the author. Workplaces
will not only be observed by camera, but also anything involving computer
use will be subject to detailed monitoring, analyzed for both efficiency and
inappropriate use. As the cost of storage continues to drop, enormous data-
bases will be created, or disparate distributed databases linked, allowing data
to be cross-referenced in increasingly sophisticated ways.
In this very possible future, indeed perhaps in our present," there may be
nowhere to hide and little that can stay hidden.
1. Public spaces.
Moving about in public is not truly anonymous: Someone you know
may recognize you, and anyone can write down the license plate number of
your car. Nevertheless, at least in large cities, one enjoys the illusion, and to
a large extent the reality, of being able to move about with anonymity. That
freedom is soon to be a thing of the past, as the "privacy c6mmons" of public
spaces becomes subject to the enclosure of privacy-destroying technology.
Fear of crime, and the rapidly declining cost of hardware, bandwidth,
and storage, are combining to foster the rapid spread of technology for rou-
tinely monitoring public spaces and identifying individuals. Monitoring
technologies include cameras, facial recognition software, and various types
of vehicle identification systems. Related technologies, some of which have
the effect of allowing real-time monitoring and tracking of individuals, in-
clude cell-phone location technology and various types of biometric identifi-
ers.
a. Cameras.
Perhaps the most visible way in which spaces are monitored is the in-
creasingly .ubiquitous deployment of Closed Circuit Television ("CCTV")
cameras and video recorders. Monitoring occurs in both public and private
spaces. Generally, private spaces such as shopping malls are monitored by
private security, while public spaces are monitored by law enforcement.
Although public cameras are common in the United States,45 they are even
44. Cf. Tina Kelley, An Expert in Computer Security Finds His Life Is a Wide-Open Book,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1999, at C4 (describing how a group of "security experts" were able to dig up
vast amounts of information on a self-described "average citizen").
45. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Police Surveillance of Streets Turns to Video Cameras and Lis-
tening Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, at A12 (detailing the methods and equipment of several
cities' police departments).
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more widespread abroad. Perhaps because of fears of IRA terrorism, in ad-
dition to ordinary concerns about crime, the United Kingdom has pursued a
particularly aggressive program of blanketing the nation with cameras.
Cameras operated by law enforcement "are now a common feature of Brit-
ain's urban landscape .... The cameras have also moved beyond the city,
into villages, schools, hospitals and even, in Bournemouth, covering a
coastal path."46 Cameras are also commonly used on the roads to enforce
speed limits by taking photos of speeding vehicles' license plates. Polls sug-
gest that a substantial majority of the British public approves of the cameras
because they make them feel safer. And indeed, the evidence suggests that
cameras reduce, or at least displace, street crime and perhaps other antisocial
behaviors. 47
Cameras can also be placed in the office, school, and home. Visible
cameras allow parents to keep an eye on junior at day care. Hidden cameras
can be concealed in "clocks, radios, speakers, phones, and many other
items"48 to monitor caregivers and others in the home.
Cameras are also an example of how technologies can interact with each
other to multiply privacy-destroying effects. All of the videotapes in the
world are of little use unless there is someone to monitor them, a useful way
to index the contents, or a mechanical aid to scan through them. And, pic-
tures alone are only useful if there is a way to identify the people in them.
Thus, for example, the London Police obtained excellent quality photographs
of alleged participants in a violent demonstration in the City of London on
June 18, 1998, but had to post the photographs on the Internet and ask view-
ers for help in identification-it worked in some cases.49
Human monitors are expensive and far from omniscient.50 In the near
future, however, human observers will become much less important as the
task of analyzing still photos and videos will be mechanized. In some cases,
such as schools, offices, or prisons, data subjects can be compelled to wear
IDs with bar codes.51 In public, however, more sophisticated technologies,
46. Nick Taylor, Closed Circuit Television: The British Experience, 1999 STAN. TECH. L.
REv. VS 11, 1 <http:llsttr.stanford.edulSTLR/Symposia/Privacy/99-VSl l/article.html>.
47. See id. IM 12-14.
48. Hidden Cameras Solutions, Catalogue <http//www.concealedcameras.com/catalogue/
main.htmil>.
49. See City of London Police, Your Help Is Needed..., June 18, 1999 <http://
www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/citypolicefjlIfi-ame.htm>; City of London Police, Identity Parade, June
18, 1999 <http'./ww.cityoflondon.gov.uk/citypolice/idparade8.htm> (asking viewers to help
"identify any of these people photographed during the June 18 incident in the City of London"; as
of December 21, 1999, some photos were missing, labeled "now identified").
50. They may also be racist. See Taylor, supra note 46, J26-27.
51. See, ag., Teacher Firedfor Not Making Kids Wear Ds, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY
MAIL, Feb. 5, 1999, available in 1999 WVL 6710744 (stating that a teacher objected to a bar code
because he believed it to resemble the "mark of the beast"); Americans United For Separation of
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such as facial recognition technology, are needed to identify people. Facial
recognition technology is becoming better and more reliable every year.52
Current systems are already capable of picking out people present in two dif-
ferent pictures, allowing police to identify repeat demonstrators even in large
crowds assembled many weeks apart. The London police installed a system
called "Mandrake" that matches CCTV photos taken from 144 cameras in
shopping centers, parking lots, and railway stations against mug shots of
known criminals.53 The Israeli government plans to use facial recognition
technology in the hope of creating "Basel," an automated border-crossing
system.54 The United States Pentagon is also investigating the possibility of
using facial recognition systems to identify potential terrorists outside mili-
tary facilities.55
Once mated with, for example, a database full of driver's license photos,
images from a series of ubiquitous cameras could be indexed by name and
stored for an indefinite period of time. (Indeed, the United States Secret
Service and other agencies have expressed interest in a national database of
drivers licence photos, and the government has spent at least $1.5 million
helping a private corporation amass the data.)56 Assuming the index and the
videos are at least subject to subpoena (or perhaps the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act) or even routinely placed on the Internet, alibis, mystery novels, and
divorce proceedings will never be the same. One's face will nonetheless be-
come an index marker. Devices will be available that warn you every time
an individual convicted of rape or child molestation comes within 100 feet.
Stores will be able to send coupons to window shoppers who browsed but
did not enter ("Hi! Next time, wouldn't you like to see what we have in-
Church and State, Teacher Who Fears "Mark of the Beast" Fired in West Virginia, CHURCH &
STATE: AU BULL., Mar. 1999 <http://www.au.org/cs3991.htm>.
52. See, e.g., VISIONICs, CORP., FACEIT: AN AWARD-WINNING FACIAL RECOGNITION
SOFTWARE ENGINE <http://www.visionics.comlNewsroom/PDFslVisionics_Techl.pdf (describ-
ing one such system); Taylor, supra note 47, 39 (citing TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 1998).
53. Alex Richardson, TV Zooms in on Crooks' 'Faceprints,' BIRMINGHAM POST, Oct. 15,
1998, available in 1998 W'L 21493173. For some reason, the police chose to test the system in the
poorest part of London. See Taylor, supra note 46.
54. See Visionics Corp., Visionics' Face Recognition Technology Chosen For Cutting Edge
Israeli Border Crossing, Sept. 21, 1999 <http:llwww.visionics.comlNewsroomlPRslbazell.htm>.
55. See Daniel J. Dupont, Seen Before, SCI. AM., Dec. 1999 <http:llwvv.sciam.com/1999/
1299issue/1299techbus5.html>.
56. See IMAGE DATA, LLC, APPLICATION OF IDENTITY VERIFICATION AND PRIVACY
ENHANCEMENT TO TREASURY TRANSACTIONS: A MULTIPLE USE IDENTITY CRIME PREVENTION
PILOT PROJECT 3 (1997) <http://wv.epic.org/privacy/imagedata/imagedata.btml> (document
submitted to United States Secret Service proposing to "show the technical and financial feasibility
of using remotely stored digital portrait images to securely perform positive identification"); Brian
Campbell, Secret Service Aided License Photo Database, CNN.COM, Feb. 18, 1999 <http://
www.cnn.comfUS/9902/18/license.photos/>.
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side?"). Worse still, once you enter, the store will be able to determine
which merchandise to show you and how much to charge.
57
b. Cellphone monitoring.
Many people can be tracked today without the use of cameras or any
other device. Cellular phones must communicate their location to a base sta-
tion in order to carry or receive calls. Therefore, whenever a cell phone is in
use, or set to receive calls, it effectively identifies the location of its user
every few minutes (within an area defined by the tolerance of the telephone).
Recently, Maryland and Virginia officials unveiled a plan to use mobile
phone tracking information to monitor traffic flows, although their plan does
not involve capturing the identities of individual commuters, only their
movements.58
The finer the cell phone zone, the more precisely a person's location can
be identified. In the United States, a Federal Communications Commission
("FCC")* regulation due to become effective in 2001 requires all United
States cellular carriers to ensure that their telephones and networks will be
able to pinpoint a caller's location to within 400 feet, about half a block, at
least sixty-seven percent of the time.59 The original objective of the rule was
to allow emergency 911 calls to be traced, but the side-effect will be to turn
cell phones into efficient tracking devices. Indeed, in a recent order, the
FCC confirmed that wireline, cellular, and broadband Personal Communica-
tions Services (PCS) carriers would be required to disclose to law enforce-
ment agents with wiretap authorization the location of a cell site at the
beginning and termination of a mobile call. This was less than the FBI, the
Justice Department, and the New York Police Department wanted; they had
argued that they should be entitled to all location information available to the
carrier.60
57. See generally . Bradford DeLong & A. Michael Froomkin, Speculative Microeconomics
for Tonorrow's Economy, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL
INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Brian Kahin & Hal Varian eds., forthcoming 2000)
<http.//www.law.miami.edu/-froomkintarticles/spec.htm>.
58. See Alan Sipress, Tracking Traffic by Cell Phone: Md., Va. to Use Transmissions to Pin-
point Congestion, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1999, at Al (stating that Maryland and Virginia will track
"anonymous" callers on highways to measure speed of traffic).
59. See Compatibility of Wireless Services with Enhanced 911, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,348, 40,349
(1996) (codified at 47 C.F.1L pt. 20). The FCC's approach differs from that adopted by some tele-
phone manufacturers who have designed their phones with Global Positioning Satellite ("GPS")
receivers, These receivers display the phone's precise latitude, longitude, and elevation, which the
user can then relay to the 911 operator, but only if the user is able to speak. See Steve Ginsberg,
Cell Phones Get a Homing Device, S.F. BUSINESS TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998 <http.//www.amcity.com
sanfranciscolstoriesl1998109281focus7.html>.
60. See FCC, Third Report and Order in the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law




Governments are not the only ones who want to know where people are.
Parents could use cell phone tracking to locate their children (or where they
left the phone). Merchants are also interested in knowing who is in the
neighborhood. A United Kingdom cell phone company is sending "elec-
tronic vouchers" to its six million subscribers, informing them of "special
offers" from pubs in the area from which they are calling and helpfully sup-
plying the nearby address. 61
The privacy-destroying consequences of cell phone tracking increase
dramatically when movement is archived. It is one thing to allow police to
use the data to track a fugitive in real time. It is another thing to archive the
data, perhaps even in perpetuity, in case police or others wish to reconstruct
someone's movements. In 1997, a Swiss newspaper revealed that a local
phone company kept information recording the movement of one million
subscribers, accurate to within a few hundred meters, and that the data was
stored for more than six months. Swiss police described the data as a treas-
ure trove.62 However atypical the collection and retention of cellular phone
subscribers' movements may be, the Swiss phone company's actions are
clearly not unique.63 The Swiss government, at least, values this locational
data so highly that it will go to great lengths to preserve its access to it. Re-
ports in 1998 suggested that the Swiss police felt threatened by the ability of
Swiss cell phone users to buy prepaid phone cards that would allow certain
types of "easy" telephones to be used anonymously. The Swiss government
therefore proposed that citizens be required to register when acquiring "easy"
cell phones, arguing that being able to identify who is using a cell phone was
"essential" to national seCurity.64
c. Vehicle monitoring.
Automobiles are a separate potential target of blanket surveillance. So-
called "intelligent transportation systems" ("ITS") are being introduced in
many urban areas to manage traffic flow, prevent speeding, and in some
61. See Watching Me, Watching You, BBC NEws, Jan. 4, 2000 <http://newsvote.bbe.co.uk
hi/english/uk/newsid 590000/590696.stm>.
62. See Daniel Polak, GSM Mobile Network in Switzerland Reveals Location of its Users,
PRIVACY FORUM DIGEST, Dec. 31, 1997 <http:llwvw.vortex.comlprivacy/priv.06.18>.
63. See, e.g., Nicole Krau, Now Hear This: Your Every Move is Being Tracked, HA'ARETZ,
Mar. 10, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17467375 (stating that Israeli cellular phone records are
stored by cellular phone companies and sold to employers who wish to track employees, as well as
provided to government when ordered by court); see also Richard B. Schmitt, Cell-Phone Hazard:
Little Privacy in Billing Records, WALL ST. J, Mar. 16, 1999, at BI (stating that AT&T wireless
unit fields roughly 15,000 subpoenas for phone records peryear).
64. See Gabriel Sigrist, Odilo Guntern: Le Ditenteur de Natel Doit Pouvoir Rester Anonyme,
LETEMPS July 7, 1998 <http/l/www.inetone.com/cypherpunks/dir.98.07.1398.07.19/msg00084.html>.
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cases implement road pricing or centralized traffic control.65 Ultimately, ITS
promise continuous, real-time information as to the location of all moving
vehicles.66 Less complex systems already create travel records that can be
stored and accessed later.67 Some countries have also considered putting bar
codes on license plates to ease vehicle identification.68 While it is possible to
design ITS in a manner that preserves the traveler's anonymity,69 this has not
been the norm.
2. Monitoring in the home and office.
Staying home may be no defense against monitoring and profiling. Ex-
isting technology can monitor every electronic communication, be it a tele-
phone call, fax, or email. In the United States, at least, its use by either the
government or private snoops is subject to substantial legal restrictions. As
voiceprint, voice recognition, and content-analysis technology continue to
improve, the tasks of sorting the ever-increasing volume of communications
will be subjected to increasingly sophisticated automated processing.70
Meanwhile, a number of legal technologies are already being deployed to
track and archive many uses of the web.
a. Workplace surveillance.
Outside of restrooms, and the few laws banning wiretapping and reading
email during transmission,71 there are relatively few privacy protections ap-
plicable to every workplace in the nation.72 Thus, employers may use hidden
65. See generally Santa Clara Symposium on Privacy and IVHS, 11 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 1 (1995) (dedicated to privacy and "intelligent vehicle highway
systems").
66. See Margaret M. Russell, Privacy andIVHS: A Diversity of Fiewpoints, 11 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 145, 163 (1995).
67. See id. at 164-65.
68. See Andrew Sparrow, Car Tagging May Help Cut Theft, Says Minister, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3053349.
69. See, e.g., ONTARIO INFO. AND PRIVACY COMM'R, 407 EXPRESS TOLL ROUTE: HOW YOU
CAN TRAVEL THIS ROAD ANONYMOUSLY (1998) <http://www.ipe.on.catwebsite.engtmatters/
sumpap/PAPERS/407.htm> ("A significant amount of work was required to ensure that the 407
ETR toll and billing system did not compromise personal privacy.").
70. See, e.g., University of Southern California, Novel Neural Net Recognizes Spoken Words
Better Than Hunan Listeners, SCI. DAILY MAG., Oct. 1, 1999 <http:llwww.sciencedaily.com/
releases/1999/10/991001064257.htn> (announcing advance in machine recognition of human
speech).
71. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2710 (1968).
72. See Robert G. Boehmer, Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance of Employees: the Fine
Line Dividing the Pndently Managed Enterprise from the Modern Sweatshop, 41 DEPAuL L. REV.
739, 739 (1992) ("Except for outrageous conduct and the use of one of a discrete group of tech-
niques that Congress has chosen to regulate, the law supplies employees with precious little protec-
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cameras, monitoring software, and other forms of surveillance more or less at
will.73 A 1993 survey, taken long before surveillance technology got cheap,
showed that twenty million workers were subject to monitoring of their com-
puter files, voice and electronic mail, and other networking commnunica-
tions.74 Today, digital cameras are so small they fit on a one-inch by two-
inch chip. Miniaturization lowers costs, which are expected to fall to only a
few dollars per camera.75 At these prices and sizes, ubiquitous and hidden
monitoring is easily affordable. Software designed to capture keystrokes,
either overtly or surreptitiously, is also readily available. For example, a
program called "Investigator 2.0" costs under one hundred dollars and, once
installed on the target PC, covertly monitors everything that it does and rou-
tinely emails detailed reports to the boss.76 In addition, every technology
described below that can be targeted at the home can also be targeted at the
office.
b. Electronic communications monitoring.
According to a report prepared for the European Parliament, the United
States and its allies maintain a massive worldwide spying apparatus capable
of capturing all forms of electronic communications.77 Known as 'Echelon,"
the network can "access, intercept and process every important modem form
of communications, with few exceptions."78 The network is supported by a
variety of processing technologies. Voiceprint recognition makes it possible
to determine whether any of the participants in a call are on a watch list. If
they are, the recording can be routed to a human being for review.79 Simi-
larly, text messages such as faxes and emails can be run through so-called
tion from the assault on workplace privacy. Similarly, the law provides employers with little guid-
ance concerning the permissible depth of their intrusions.").
73. Covert video surveillance violates some states' laws. See Quentin Burrows, Scowl Be-
cause You're on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1114-
21 (1997) (collecting cases and statutes).
74. See Gary Marx, Measuring Everything That Moves: The New Surveillance at Work
<http:lweb.mit.edulgtmarxlwwwlida6.hxnl>.
75. See Daniel Grotta & Sally Wiener Grotta, Camera on a Chip, ZDNET PC MAG, Oct, 7,
1999 <http:lwvw.zdnet.comlpcmaglstoriesltrendslO,7607,2349530,00.htm>.
76. See Stuart Glascock, Stealth Softvare Rankles Privacy Advocates, TECHWEB, Sept. 9,
1999 <http:llwww.techweb.com/wirelstoryMlVB19990917S0014>.
77. See DUNCAN CAMPBELL, DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND RISK OF
ABUSE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION: AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR POLITICAL CONTROL
(1999) <http://jya.com/ic2000-dc.htm> [hereinafter STOA REPORT].
78. Id. at Summary 2.
79. "Contrary to reports in the press, effective 'word spotting' search systems automatically to
select telephone calls of intelligence interest are not yet available, despite 30 years of research.
However, speaker recognition systems-in effect, 'voiceprints'-have been developed and are
deployed to recognise [sic] the speech of targeted individuals making international telephone calls."
Id. at Summary 17.
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dictionary programs that flag messages with interesting references or word
patterns. 80 As artificial intelligence improves, these programs should be-
come increasingly sophisticated. Meanwhile, advances in voice recognition
(translating speech into text) promise to transform the telephone monitoring
problem into another type of text problem. Further, once a conversation is
converted into text, the National Security Agency ("NSA") is ready to gauge
its importance with semantic forests: The NSA recently received a patent on
a computerized procedure that produces a topical summary of a conversation
using a "tree-word-list" to score the text. The patent describes a "pre-
processing" phase that removes "stutter phrases" from a transcript. Then, a
computer automatically assigns a label, or topic description, to the text.8'
The method promises to allow computerized sorting and retrieval of tran-
scripts and other documents based upon their meaning, not just keywords.82
Not only have the communications intelligence agencies of the United
States and its major allies "reaffirmed their requirements for access to all the
world's communications," 8 3 but they have also taken a number of steps in the
past two years to ensure they can get it. The NSA installed "sniffer" soft-
ware to monitor and collect traffic at nine major Internet exchange points84
On May 7, 1999, the European Parliament passed the Lawful Interception of
Communications Resolution on New Technologies,s known as Enfopol.
Although the Enfopol resolution is nonbinding, it serves as a declaration of
the regulatory agenda of the European law enforcement community. Under
the Enfopol proposal, Internet service providers and telephone companies in
Europe would be required to provide law enforcement agencies with full-
time, real-time access to all Internet transmissions. In addition, wireless
communications providers would be required to provide geographical posi-
tion information locating their cell phone customers. If the service provider
80. See id. §3 72.
81. See Patent 5937422: Automatically generating a topic description for text and searching
and sorting text by topic using the same <http:llcryptome.orglnsa-vox-pat.htm>.
82. See Suelette Dreyfus, This Is Just Between Us (and the Spies), INDEPENDENT, Nov. 15,
1999 <http://vwiv.independent.co.uk/news/Digital/Features/spiesl5l199.shtml>.
83. STOA REPORT, supra note 77, §1, 6.
84. Seeid. §2, 60.
85. European Parliament, Legislative resolution embodying Parliament's opinion on the draft
Council Resolution on the lawful interception of telecommunications in relation to new technolo-




@BIBLIO99]PLAGE@l&TYPEF=TITRE&NUMB=2&DATEF--990507>. As of March 2000,
European governments had yet to reach a final agreement on Enfopol due to disputes regarding its
application to bank secrecy rules. See Jelle van Buuren, No Final Agreement on Convention on




offers encryption as part of the cell phone service, the provider would be re-
quired to ensure that it be able to decode the messages. 86
Similarly, in the United States, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA") requires that all new telecommunica-
tions networks be engineered to allow lawful wiretaps, although it does not
address the issue of encryption. 87 The legislation also does not specify how
many simultaneous wiretaps the network should be able to support, leaving
this to the implementing regulations. In its initial assessment of "capacity
requirements," the FBI proposed requiring carriers in major urban areas to
install a maximum surveillance capacity of one percent of "engineered ca-
pacity"-in other words, to make it possible for a maximum of one out of
every one hundred phone lines to be monitored simultaneously.88 This pro-
posal was so controversial that the FBI withdrew it and substituted a differ-
ent capacity projection.89 Although not free from all ambiguity, the revised
rule appears to require very large capacity provisions. For example, the
Center for Democracy and Technology calculated that under the formula
proposed by the FBI, the system would have to be able to perform 136,000
simultaneous intercepts in the Los Angeles area alone.90
Domestic wiretapping without a court order is illegal in the United
States, and only law enforcement and counter-intelligence agencies are al-
lowed to apply for warrants.91 State and federal courts authorized 1329
86. See Madeleine Acey, Europe Votes for ISP Spying Infrastructure, TECHWEB, May 13,
1999 <http:lwwv.techweb.comwirestory/TWB19990513S009>.
87. See 1994 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C
§§ 1001-1010 and scattered sections of 18 & 47 U.S.C.); cf James X. Dempsey, Communications
Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J.
SCi. & TECH. 65 (1997) (arguing that recent changes in communications technology have required
reexamination of privacy policy).
88. See Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 60 Fed.
Reg. 53,643, 53,645 (proposed Oct. 16, 1995). To be fair, the FBI assessment lumped together
wiretap needs along with less intrusive forms of surveillance such as pen registers and "trap and
trace" operations, which reveal information about who is speaking to whom without disclosing the
substance of the conversation. See id.
89. See Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 1902 (proposed Jan. 14, 1997).
90. See Center for Democracy and Technology, Brief ofAmicus Curiae, Cellular Telecomms.
Indus. Ass'n v. United States Tel. Ass'n, No. 1:98CV01036 & 1:98CV0210 (D.D.C. 1999) <http'J/
wwv.cdt.org/digi_telecapacitybrief.shtml>; Center for Democracy and Technology, Connents on
the FBI's Second CALEA Capacity Notice, Feb. 18, 1997 <http://www.cdt.org/digitele970218.
comments.html>.
91. Warrants are not required abroad, either when the United States is wiretapping foreigners,
see, ag., United States v. Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure, by United States agents, of property
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country), or even when democratic foreign
governments are wiretapping their own citizens. See, e.g., Nick Fielding & Duncan Campbell, Spy
Agencies Listened in on Diana, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 27, 2000 <httpJ:/wwv.the-times.co.u l/
nevs/pages/sti/2000/02/27/stinwenws02035.html?999> (alleging that "a loophole in the 1985 Inter-
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wiretaps in 1998, an increase of eighty percent over the 738 authorized a
decade earlier.92 These statistics are somewhat misleading, however, be-
cause a single wiretap order can affect hundreds of phone lines and up to
100,000 conversations.93 The statistics are also difficult to reconcile with
reports, attributed to the FBI, that on peak days up to one thousand different
telephone lines are tapped in the Los Angeles area.94 Although the number
of wiretap orders is increasing, and the number of persons subject to legal
eavesdropping is also increasing, these statistics are still small compared to
the enormous volume of telecommunications. One reason why wiretaps re-
main relatively rare may be that judges have to approve them (although the
number of wiretaps refused annually is reputed to be near zero); another,
perhaps more important reason, is that they are expensive. The average cost
of a wiretap is over $57,000,95 with much of the expense attributable to pay-
ing the people who listen to the calls. However, as technology developed by
intelligence agencies trickles down to domestic law enforcement, the mar-
ginal cost of telephone, fax, and email surveillance should decline considera-
bly. Even if domestic law enforcement agencies remain scrupulously within
the law,96 the number of legal wiretaps is likely to increase rapidly once the
cost constraint is reduced.97
ception of Communication Act means intelligence officials can put individuals and organisations
[sic] under surveillance without a specific ministerial warrant).
92. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1998 WIRETAP REPORT 5 (1999)
<http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap98/contents.html;> Associated Press, State Authorities' Wiretap-
ping Up, May 5, 1999 <http://jya.comwiretap98.htm>.
93. See Marc Cooper, Wired, NEWSTIMESLA.COM., Jan. 23, 1998 <http://www.
newtimesla.com/archives/1998/081398/featurel-2.html> ("Under the single wiretap authorization
that produced the Gastelum-Gaxiola case, a mind-boggling 269 phone lines, including an entire
retail cellular phone company, were monitored. Taps on just three pay phones at the L.A. County
jail in Lynwood, for instance, yielded about 100,000 conversations in six months, according to the
Public Defender's office.").
94. See id.
95. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 92, at Table 5.
96. There is reason to doubt that they do. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 93 (describing LAPD
officers' testimony concerning hundreds of illegal "hand ofts" of information, acquired in one
wiretap, in order to initiate new cases via fictitious informants); Los Angeles Public Defenders
Office, State Wiretap Related Cases <http.//pd.co.a.ca.us/cases.htm> (listing known and suspected
cases affected by illegal LAPD use of wiretap information).
97. There are also powerful commercial incentives to privately gather caller information. For
example, British Telecom searched its records to find people who were regularly calling competing
Internet service providers, and had its sales staff call and encourage them to switch to BT. See
Office of Telecomms., OFTEL Acts to Ensures Fair Competition in Marketing ofBT Click Internet
Services, Sept. 24, 1998 <http:llwvv.worldserver.pipex.com/coildepts/GOT/coi6O43e.ok?> (an-





The worldwide web is justly celebrated as a cornucopia of information
available to anyone with an Internet connection. The aspects of the web that
make it such a powerful information medium (its unregulated nature, the
flexibility of browsing software and the underlying protocols, and its role as
the world's largest library, shopping mall, and chat room) all combine to
make the web a fertile ground for harvesting personal data about Internet
surfers. The more that people rely on the web for their reading and shop-
ping, the more likely it becomes that data about their interests, preferences,
and economic behavior will be captured and made part of personal profiles.
The baseline level of user monitoring is built into the most popular
browsers and operates by default. Clicking on a link instructs a browser to
automatically disclose the referring page to the new site. If a person has en-
tered a name or email address in the browser's communication software that
too will be disclosed automatically.98 These features cannot be turned off-
they are part of the hypertext transfer protocol-although one can delete
one's name and email address from the software. Web surfers can, however,
employ privacy-enhancing tools such as the anonymizer to mask personal
information.99
The default setting on the two most popular browsers (Internet Explorer
and Netscape Navigator) allows web sites to set and read all the "cookies"
they want. Cookies are a means by which a browser allows a web site to
write data a user's hard drive.100 Often this works to the user's advantage-
stored passwords eliminate the need to memorize or retype passphrases. Pref-
erence information allows a web designer to customize web pages to match
individual users' tastes. But the process is usually invisible; and even when
made visible, it is not transparent since few cookies are user-readable.
Cookies present a number of potential privacy problems. Any user data
disclosed to a site, such as an address or phone number, can be embedded in
a cookie. That information can then be correlated with user ID numbers set
by the site to create a profile. If taken to its limit, this would permit a par-
ticularly intrusive site to build a dossier on the user. An online newspaper
might, for example, keep track of the articles a reader selects, allowing it
over time to construct a picture of the reader's interests. Cookies can be
shared between web sites, allowing savvy web designers to figure out what
other sites their visitors patronize, and (to the extent the other sites store in-
formation in cookies) what they have revealed to those other sites. When
pieced together, this "clicktrail" can quietly reveal both personal and com-
98. To find out what your browser says about you, visit Privacy Analysis of Your Internet
Connection at <http:llprivacy.netlanonynizer/>.
99. See Anonymizer <http:Ilwww.anonymizer.conl3.0/index.shtml>.
100. See generally Netscape, Cookie Central <http://Www.cookiecentral.com>.
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mercial information about a user without her ever being aware of it. A fre-
quent visitor to AIDS sites, a regular purchaser of anti-cancer medicine, or
even someone who has a passion for Barry Manilow, all may have reasons
for not wanting others to know of their interests or actions.
Complicating matters, what appears as one page in a browser may actu-
ally be made up of multiple parts originating from multiple servers. Thus, it
is possible to embed visible, or even invisible, content in a web page, which
provides an occasion for setting a cookie. Doubleclick, an Internet advertis-
ing company, serves ads that appear on a large number of commercial and
advertising-supported web pages. By checking for the Doubleclick cookie,
the company can assign a unique identifier to each surfer and not only trace
which Doubleclick-affiliated web sites they visit, but also when, how often,
and what they choose to view while they are there1OI
Cookies, however, are only the tip of the iceberg. Far more intrusive
features can be integrated into browsers, into softvare downloaded from the
Internet,l02 and into viruses or Trojan horses.10 3 In the worst case, the soft-
ware could be configured to record every keystroke.
The United States government suggested that Congress should authorize
law enforcement and counter-intelligence agencies to remotely access and
plant a back door in suspects' computers.104 Using a back door could give
the government access to every keystroke, allowing it to learn passwords and
decrypt files protected with strong, otherwise uncrackable, cryptography.05
The proposal in the original draft of the Cyberspace Electronic Security Act
was sufficiently ambiguous that some imagined the government might even
contract with makers of popular software to plant back doors that could be
activated remotely as part of an investigation.106 Instead, the clause in ques-
101. See Chris Oakes, Doubleclick Plan Falls Short, WIRED NEWvS, Feb. 2000 <http.//
wwv.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,34337,00.html>.
102. E.g., Chris Oakes, Mouse Pointer Records Clicks, WIRED NE s, Nov. 30, 1999 <http.//
wwv.wired.comlnewsltechnology0,1282,32788,00.html>.
103. A trojan horse is a "malicious, security-breaking program that is disguised as something
benign, such as a directory lister, archiver, game, or... a program.. ." FOLDOC, Trojan Horse
<http://wombatdoe.ic.ac.ukfoldoc/foldoe.cgiquery=trojan+horse>.
104. See Draft Cyberspace Electronic Security Act Bill, Aug. 4, 1999, § 203 (to amend 18
U.S.C. 2713) <http://www.cdt.orglcrypto/CESAIdraftCESAbill.shtml>. A "back door" is a deliber-
ate hole in system security. See FOLDOC, Back Door <http.//wombat.doe.ic.ac.uk/foldoe/
foldoe.cgiback+door>.
105. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Justice Department Mulls Covert-Action Bill, WASH. POST,
Aug. 20, 1999, at Al <ht3Jlwww.washingtonposLeomlwp-srvlbusinessdaily/aug99eneryption20.htm>.
106. The DOJ Section by Section analysis of The Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999
(Aug 4, 1999) <http'//www.cdt.org/crypto/CESA/CESAanalysis.shtmlgsecret>, noted that proposed
§ 2713 allowed a governmental entity to seek a warrant to search not only for data but also "other
information necessary to obtain access to the plaintext of data or communications, or to install and
use a recovery device." As the DOJ noted, proposed § 2713 defined a "recovery device' as "any
enabling or modification of any part of a computer or other system, including hardware or software,
that allows plaintext to be obtained even if attempts are made to protect it through encryption or
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tion, § 2713, was quickly dropped in the face of furious opposition from civil
liberties groups.107 Other countries have considered similar plans. For ex-
ample, according to the uncensored version of the Australian Walsh Re-
port,1oB intelligence agencies sought authority to alter softvare or hardware
so that it would function as a bugging device, capturing all user keystrokes
when activated by law enforcement authorities.109
Monitoring issues also arise in the context of automated intellectual
property rights management. Proposals abound for "copyright management
technologies" (sometimes unkindly dubbed "snitchware"),lo which would
other security techniques or devices." This definition seemed capacious enough to include back
doors built into software that could be activated remotely-something that would expose law en-
forcement agents to far less risk than making surreptitious entry to gain access to the target com-
puter.
107. See The Center for Democracy and Technology, A Briefing on Public Policy Issues
Affecting Civil Liberties Online, CDT POL'Y POST, Sept. 17, 1999, at 22 <http://%Iww.cdt.org/
publications/pp 5.22.shtml/#3> (noting change in administration position).
108. For the strange saga of the attempts to censor the Walsh report, seeTHE WALSH REPORT:
REVIEW OF POLICY RELATING TO ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES <http://wwvrv.efa.org.au/Issues/
CryptolWalsh/>.
109. See id. § 1.2.33.
Authority should be created for the AFP, the NCA and ASIO to alter proprietary software so
that it performs additional functions to those specified by the manufacturer. Such an authority,
which clearly should be subject to warranting provisions, would, for example, enable passive
access to a computer work station of a LAN and link investigative capability more effectively
to current technology. While there are issues of liability, the Review is convinced the effort
should be made to accommodate these so that a target computer may be converted to a listen-
ing device. This capacity may represent one of the important avenues of accessing plain text.
Id.
The opportunity may present itself to the AFP, NCA or ASIO to alter software located in
premises used by subjects of intensive investigation or destined to be located in those prem-
ises. The software (or more rarely the hardware) may relate to communication, data storage,
encoding, encryption or publishing devices. While some modifications may have the effect of
creating a listening device which may be remotely monitored by means of the telecommunica-
tions service, for which purposes extant warranting provisions would provide, others may cre-
ate an intelligent memory, a permanent set of commands not specified in the program written
by the manufacturer or a remote switching device with a capacity to issue commands at re-
quest. The cooperation of manufacturers or suppliers may sometimes be obtained by agencies.
When manufacturers or suppliers are satisfied the modification has no discernible effect on
function, they may consent to assist or acquiesce in its installation. It will not always be possi-
ble, however, to approach manufacturers or suppliers or the latter may be in no position to con-
sent to modification of proprietary software. When agencies are investigating a high priority
target, practising [sic] effective personal and physical security, moving premises and changing
telephone/fax regularly, an opportunity to access the target's computer equipment may repre-
sent not only the sole avenue but potentially the most productive.
Id. § 6.2.10.
110. See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copy-
right Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) <http://wwvr.law.georgetown.
edu/faculty/jec/read-anonymously.pdf>; Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Eco-
nomic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1998) <http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/faculty/jec/Lochner.pdi>; Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Man-
agement Systems and Laws Designed to Protect 7Tem, 12 BERK. TECH. L.J. 161 <http://www.lawv.
berkeley.edu/joumals/btlj/articles/12_l/Cohenhtml/texthtml>.
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record and in some cases disclose every time a user accessed a document,
article, or even page of licensed material in order to finely assess charges.
Similarly, digital watermarking systems,' I I which insert invisible customized
tags into electronic documents, allow those documents to be tracked. Using
various forms of these technologies, owners of valuable proprietary data can
sell the information with less fear that it will be copied without payment. If
the information is sold in encrypted form, along with a program or device
that decrypts it every time a licensee wishes to view part of the content,
charging can be done on a pay-per-view basis rather than requiring a large
fee in advance. Leaving aside the issue of the effect on fair use,112 monitor-
ing for pricing purposes only raises privacy issues if information is recorded
(and thus discoverable or subject to search and seizure) or reported to the
licensor. If only the quantity of use is reported, rather than the particular
pages viewed or queries run, user privacy is unaffected. When metering is
conducted in real time, however, it is particularly difficult for a user to be
confident about what is being reported. If, for example, a copyright man-
agement system connects via the Internet to the content owner to ensure
billing or even payment before access, then only the most sophisticated user
will be able to determine how much information is being transmitted. The
temptation to create user profiles for marketing purposes may be quite great.
Already, programs that quietly report, to a central registry in real time,
every URL viewed are common. Click on "what's related" in the default
configuration of Netscape 4.06 or above and every URL visited in that
browser session will be reported back to a server at Netscape/AOL. Alone,
this information only tells Netscape which sites people consider related to
others; it helps them construct a database they can use to guide future surfers.
But this data, in conjunction with cookies that recorded personal information,
could be used to build extensive dossiers of individual users. There is no
evidence that Netscape does this, but there is no technical obstacle prevent-
ing it.113
111. See, e.g., Digirnark Corp. <http://wwv.digimare.com>.
112. See note 110 supra.
113. See Matt Curtin, Gary Ellison & Doug Monroe, "What's Related?" Everything But Your
Privacy, Oct. 10, 1998 <http://www.interhack'net/pubs/whatsrelated>.
Netscape promises not to misuse the information, and there is no reason to doubt this. See
Netscape, Are there Privacy Issues with What's Related? <http://home.netscape.comfescapes/
related/faq.html#12>. Nonetheless, the threat seems particularly acute because Netscape itself sets
a fairly detailed cookie before allowing download of browsers containing 128-bit cryptography.
Curtin et. al, supra. Furthermore, Netscape's reaction to the Curtin, Ellison, and Monroe report was
intemperate at best. Netscape set its "what's related" feature to show the Unabomber manifesto as





Hardware manufacturers are also deploying privacy-compromising fea-
tures in a wide variety of devices. The General Motors corporation has
equipped more than six million vehicles with (until recently) secret devices,
akin to airplane flight data recorders known as "black boxes," that are able to
record crash data. First introduced in 1990, the automobile black boxes have
become progressively more powerful. The 1994 versions:
record[ed] 11 categories of information, including the amount of deceleration,
whether the driver was wearing a seat belt, whether the airbag was disabled, any
system malfunctions recorded by the on-board computer at the time of the crash
and when the airbag inflated. A more sophisticated system installed in some
1999 models also records velocity, brake status and throttle position for five
seconds before impact.114
Other manufacturers include less elaborate data recorders in their cars.
Makers of computer chips and ethernet card adapters used for network-
ing and for high-speed Internet access routinely build in unique serial num-
bers to their hardware, which can then be accessed easily over the web.
Each Intel Pentium III chip has a unique identification number. Intel
originally designed the chip ID to function continuously and be accessible to
software such as web browsers.15 The intention appears to have been to
make electronic anonymity impossible. Anonymous users might, Intel rea-
soned, commit fraud or pirate digital intellectual property.1 16 With a unique,
indelible ID number on each chip, software could be configured to work only
on one system. Users could only mask their identities when many people
used a single machine, or when one person used several machines. The
unique ID could also serve as an index number for web sites, cookie count-
ers, and other means of tracking users across the Internet.
The revelation that Intel was building unique serial numbers into
Pentium III chips caused a small furor. In response, Intel announced it
would commission a software program that would turn off the ID function.! 17
However, Intel's software can be circumvented by a sufficiently malicious
114. Bob Van Voris, Black Box Car Idea Opens Can of Worms, NAT'L L.L, June 7, 1999
<http://www.lawnewsnetwork.com/stories/A2024-1999Jun4.html>.
115. See Stephanie Miles, Intel Downplays Chip Hack Report, Feb. 24, 1999 <http://news.
cnetconlnews/0-1003-200-339182.html?tag=> ('Pentium M's serial code can be retrieved without
the user's knowledge or approval.").
116. See Patrick Gelsinger, A Billion Trusted Computers (Jan. 20, 1999) <http://vw.intel.
comlpressroomlarchive/speecheslpg012099.htm>; see also Robert Lemos, Intel: Privacy Is Our
Concern as Well, ZDNET NEWS, Jan. 20, 1999 <http:llwww.zdnetcomlzdnnstorieslnewsl
0,4586,2190019,00.hftl> (noting Intel's argument that security justifies a loss of some privacy).
117. See Big Brother Inside Homepage <http://wvww.bigbrotherinside.com/Inotenough>.
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program and the ID number surreptitiously broadcast in a cookie or by other
means.118
Intel is not the only company to put unique serial numbers into its com-
munication-related products. For many years, all ethernet cards, the basis for
networks and most DSL19 connections, had a "Media Access Control"
(MAC), a six-byte (usually represented as twelve alphanumeric characters)
ID number built into them. This unique, unchangeable number is important
for networks, because it forms part of each device's address, ensuring that no
two devices get confused with each other, and that no data packets get mis-
delivered. The privacy issues become most acute when such a card is part of
a computer that is used on the Internet or other communications networks,
because the number can be used to identify the computer to which the
ethernet card is attached.
Indeed, the new Internet Protocol version 6 ("IPv6"),120 which will
gradually replace the current Internet protocol, contemplates using an
ethernet card's unique ID to create a globally unique identifier ("GUID").
The IPv6 standard requires software to include a GUID in the header of
every Internet communication (email, web browsing, chat, and others).
Computers with an ethernet card would create a GUID by combining the
unique ID number assigned to the card's manufacturer with a unique number
assigned to the card in the factory.12, Thus, "[e]very packet you send out
onto the public Internet using IPv6 has your fingerprints on it. And unlike
your IP address under IPv4, which you can change, this address is embedded
in your hardware. Permanently."122 In response to criticism, the standard-
setting bodies are reconsidering revisions which would allow users-if they
are savvy enough to do so--to pick a random number to replace the GUID
118. See Michael Kanellos & Stephanie Miles, Software Claims to Undo Pentium HI Fix,
CNET NEWS, Mar. 10, 1999 <http'//news.cnetcomfnewst0-1003-200-339803.htmfltag=>.
119. DSL stands for "Digital Subscriber Line." See generally John Kristoff, comp.dcom.xdsl
Frequently Asked Questions <http"//homepage.interaccess.com/-jkristof/xdsl-faqtxt>
120. See generally STEVE KING, RUTH FAX, DIMITRY HASKING, WEAKEN LING, TOM
MEEHAN, ROBERT FINK & CHARLES B. PERKINS, THE CASE FOR IPV6 4 (1999) <http://www.ietf.
orglintemet-drafts/draft-iab-case-for-ipv6-05.txt> (touting IPv6's "enhanced features, such as a
larger address space and improved packet formats"); Ipv6: The Next Generation Internet!
<http://www.ipv6.org>.
121. See KING et al., supra note 120, at 34 (defining IPv6 required header to include "a ge-
neric local address prefix to a unique token (typically derived from the host's IEEE LAN interface
address)"; see also IEEE, Guidelines for 64-bit Global Identifier (EUI-64) Registration Authority
<http://standards.ieee.orgregauthlouiltutorialslEUI64.hr1l> (explaining ID numbers).




from time to time.123 But this modification is still under consideration and
would not, apparently, be the default.
Even before IPv6 was introduced, some software products, notably Word
97, Excel 97, and PowerPoint 97, routinely embedded a unique ID number
into every document. If a computer had an ethernet card, the programs used
its MAC, much like IPv6.124 As a result, it became possible for law en-
forcement and others to trace the authorship of seemingly anonymous docu-
ments if they could match the MAC to a computer. This matching task was
made easier by another Microsoft product: The initial version of the Win-
dows 98 registration wizard transmitted the unique ID to Microsoft; visitors
to the Microsoft web site who had previously registered were then given a
cookie with the ID number25 As a result, the Microsoft ID not only identi-
fied a computer, but tied it directly to an individual's personal data. These
features were not documented.2 6 Although there is no reason to believe that
Microsoft used the information for anything other than tracking the use of its
website, there are powerful financial and commercial incentives for corpora-
tions to collect this information. A filing in a recent lawsuit claims that user
information collected by Yahoo was worth four billion dollars.127 Not sur-
prisingly, other companies, including RealNetworks and Amazon.com, have
been collecting, or considering collecting, similar personal information.128
Indeed, it is possible that Microsoft's data collection activity was a dry run
for something more elaborate. Documents disclosed during the Microsoft
123. See THOMAS NARTEN, & R. DRAVES, PRIVACY EXTENsIONS FOR STATELESS ADDRESS
AUTOCONFIGURATION IN IPv6 1 (1999) <fip:/ftp.isi.edurmtemet-draftsldraft-ietf-ipngwg-addrconf-
privacy-01.txt>.
124. See YusefMehdi, Microsoft Addresses Customers' Privacy Concerns, PRESSPASS, Mar.
8, 1999 <http:lwww.microsoft.comlpresspasslfeaturesl1999/03-Ogcustletter2.htm> ("The unique
identifier number inserted into Office 97 documents was designed to help third parties build tools to
work with, and reference, Office 97 documents. The unique indentifier generated for Office 97
documents contains information that is derived in part from a network card.... ."). Until the most
recent revisions, these numbers were then transmitted during the Windows 98 registration process.
See Mike Ricciuti, Microsoft Admits Privacy Problem, Plans Fix, CNET NEWS, Mar. 7, 1999
<http:llnews.cnet.comlnews/0-1006-200-339622.html?st.ne.160.head>.
125. See David Methvin, WinMag Exclusive: Windows 98 Privacy Issue Is Worse than You
Thought, TECHWEB, Mar. 12, 1999 <http:llwww.windowsmagazine.comnewsl19991030IlO312a.htm>.
Users can test for the problem at Pharlap Software, Windows 98 RegWiz Privacy Leak Demo Page
<http'//security.pharlap.com/regwiz/index.htm>. A patch for Word 97, Excel 97, and PowerPoint
97 is available at <http://officeupdate.microsoftcomfdownloadDetails/Off97uip.htm>
126. Associated Press, Microsoft Promises a Patch for ID Feature, Mar. 9, 1999 <http://
search.nytimes.com/search/daily/homepage/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+4112+0+
wAAA+microsoft%7EID%7Eprivacy> ("the company also acknowledged it may have been har-
vesting those serial numbers from customers--along with their names and addresses-even when
customers had explicitly indicated they didn't want the numbers disclosed.").
127. Kathleen Murphy, $4B Sought from Yahoo for Not Sharing Customer Data, INTERNET
WORLD NEWS, Dec. 27, 1999 <http:/www.intemetworldnews.com/GetThisStory.cfin?Storyid=
746B3487-B95D- 1D3-976500AOCC4OB49B>.




antitrust case revealed that Microsoft had considered switching to an "annu-
ity model" by which users would have paid an annual fee for a Windows li-
cense in future versions of the operating system.' 29 Annual billing would
most likely have required registering and identifying users.
Hardware with built-in ID numbers is not yet ubiquitous, but proposals
for expanding its use are increasingly common, in part because law enforce-
ment and others fear that anonymous activities lead to criminality and antiso-
cial behavior. For example, the fear that people could use color copiers to
counterfeit United States currency has spurred makers of color copiers to put
invisible, unique ID numbers in each machine in order to trace counter-
feits.130 The ID number appears in all color copies, making every copied
document traceable to its originating machine. Because the quality of per-
sonal color printers continues to improve, the U.S. Treasury Department has
become increasingly concerned that common inkiet color printers may be-
come good enough for counterfeiters. As a result, the Treasury has begun to
investigate the possibility of requiring printer manufacturers to build tracing
information into all color printers.131
Ubiquitous hardware ID numbers are probably inevitable because they
will enable smart homes and offices. Consider, for example, the smart re-
frigerator: Its computer can automatically display a shopping list of what is
running short. The list can then automatically be sent to a shop over the
Internet. A smart fridge also can be linked to an online cookbook to suggest
suitable recipes depending upon its contents.132  Once every food is
tagged,133 and the fridge knows its expiration date, the smart fridge can even
be programmed to remind you to throw out milk that outlasts its sell-by date.
Smart home and office applications such as the smart fridge or the smart of-
fice supply cabinet will provide a cornucopia of marketing data, and the in-
formation officers of food suppliers, and others, are already devising plans to
129. See Jason Catlett, A Study of the Privacy and Competitiveness Implications of an Annuity
Model for Licensing Microsoft Windows 2000, JUNKBUSTERS, Mar. 4, 1999 <http:/www.
junkbusters.com/ht/en/bill.html>.
130. See Lauren Weinstein, IDs in Color Copies-A PRIVACY Forum Special Report,
PRIVACY FORUM DIGESr, Dec. 6, 1999 <http:llwww.vortex.comprivacy/priv.08.18>.
131. See U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Counterfeit Deterrence Features <http:l/
wwv.bep.treas.gov/countdeterrenthtn>.
132. See Ny Teknick, Electrolux Demonstrates the Smart Frdge Concept, ETHOS NEws,
Mar. 4, 1999 <http:llwww.tagish.co.uklethosub/lit7/1484e.htm>; see also Joseph 'Jofish' Kaye,
Counter Intelligence & Kitchen Sync: White Paper 3 (June 1999) (unpublished manuscript)
<http.llwww.media.mit.edulcilresearchwhitepaper/cil3.htm> (detailing "Kitchen Sync," the "digi-
tally connected, self-aware kitchen").
133. See Joseph Kaye, Niko Matsakis, Matthew Gray, Andy Wheeler & Michael Hawley, PC
Dinners, Mr. Java and Counter Intelligence: Prototyping Smart Appliances for the Kitchen (Nov. 1,
1999) (unpublished manuscript submitted to IEEE) <http://www.media.mit.edu/ci/ieee.cga.jofish
ieee.cga.jofish.htm> ("We predict--even assume, in many of our scenarios-that all products sold
will have a digital ID.").
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get and use that information.134 Ultimately the information may be of inter-
est to many others as well. Insurance companies, for example, might like to
know if there are any cigarette packages in the insured's home, whether she
snacks regularly, and how often she eats fatty foods.
3. Biometrics.
Technology for identifying people is advancing at least as quickly as
technology for identifying machines. With technologies for distinguishing
human irises, fingerprints, faces, or other body parts135 improving quickly, it
seems increasingly attractive to use the "body as password" rather than base
security on a passphrase, a PIN, or a hardware token such as a smart card.136
Biometrics can be used for identification (who is this?) or authentication
(what permissions does this person have?).137
To the extent that reliance on biometric identifiers may prevent informa-
tion from being stolen or improperly disclosed, it is a privacy-enhancing
technology. Some banks now use iris scans to determine whether a person is
entitled to withdraw money from an ATM.138 The United States government
uses biometric identifiers in the border crossing identification cards issued to
aliens who frequently travel to and from the United States on business,139 as
do several states seeking to prevent fraudulent access to welfare and other
benefits.140
134. See Alice LaPlante, The Battle for the Fridge: The Food Industry Is Looking to Hook Up
Your Home to the Supply Chain, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 5, 1999, at 52(1) <http://vw.chic.sri.
com/library/linLssmart/fridge.html> ('CIOs in the grocery industry are putting in the proper tech-
nical infrastructure to collect and consolidate customer data.").
135. For a list of possibilities, see Java Card Special Interest Group, Introduction to Biomet-
rics <http://www.sjug.org/jcsigtothers/biometries intro.htm>.
136. See generally Ontario Info. & Privacy Comm'r, Consumer Biometric Applications: A
Discussion Paper <http://Vwwv.ipe.on.ca/web _site.eng/matters/sum pap/paperscons-bio.htm> (dis-
cussing biometrics, its benefits and concerns, and its effects on privacy); Clarke, supra note 9.
137. See generally Dutch Data Protection Authority (Registratiekamer), R. Hes, T.F.M.
Hooghiemstra & J.J. Borking, At Face Value: On Blometrical Ident fication and Privacy § 2 (1999)
<http://wwv.registratiekamer.nlbis/top_ 535_1.html> (discussing the various applications of
biometrics).
138. See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta, The Eyes Have it: Body Scans at the ATM, WASH. POST., June
21, 1999, at Al <http:llwww.washingtonpost.comAvp-srvlnational/daily/june99/scans2l.htm>.
139. See 8 U.S.C.A. § I 10(a)(6) (West Supp. 1999); Theta Pavis, U.S. Takes Immigration in
Hand, WIRED, Sept. 15, 1998 <http:flwvw.wired.com/newsfnewsftechnologyfstory/15014.html>
(describing INSPASS system, which relies on handprints).
140. See JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMENTS FOCUSING ON
PRIVATE SECTOR USE OF BIOMETRICS AND THE NEED FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT ACTION § II.B
(1998) <http:l/vww.nia.doc.govlntiahome/privary/mail/disklwoodward.htin> ("Arizona, Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Texas are using finger imag-
ing to prevent entitlement fraud. Florida, North Carolina and Pennsylvania have biometric
operational systems pending."); Connecticut Department of Social Services, Digital Imaging: Con-
necticut's Biometric Imaging Project <http://www.dss.state.ct.usfdigital.htm> (providing links to
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Despite the potential to enhance privacy, biometrics pose a two-pronged
threat. First, a biometric provides a unique identifier that can serve as a
high-quality index for all information available about an individual. The
more reliable a biometric identifier, the more it is likely to be used, and the
greater the amount of data likely to be linked to it.141 Because a biometric is
a part of the person, it can never be changed. It is true that current indexes,
such as social security numbers, are rarely changed, which is why they make
good indexes, but in extreme cases one can leave the country or join a wit-
ness protection program. As far as we know, changing an iris or a finger-
print is much more difficult. Second, some biometrics, particularly those
that involve DNA typing, disclose information about the data subject, such as
race, sex, ethnicity, propensity for certain diseases, and (as the genome typ-
ing improves) even more.'42 Others may provide the capability to detect
states of mind, truthfulness, fear, or other emotions.143
DNA is a particularly powerful identifier. It is almost unique144 and (so
far) impossible to change. A number of state and federal databases already
collect and keep DNA data on felons and others.145 Attorney General Janet
Reno recently asked the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evi-
dence whether a DNA sample should be collected from every person arrested
in the United States. Under this proposal, DNA information would become
part of a permanent, and sizable, national database: More than fifteen mil-
lion people were arrested in the United States in 1997 alone.'4 6 Such a plan
is far from unthinkable-the Icelandic government considered a bill to corn-
extended descriptions of biometrical imaging of AFDC and General Assistance recipients for iden-
tification purposes).
141. See Ann Cavoukian, Biometrics and Policing: Comments from a Privacy Perspective
§ 4, il POLIZEI UND DATENSCHUTZ-NUPOSITIONIERUNG IM ZEICHEN DER INFORMATIONS-
GESELLSCHAFT (Data Protection Authority ed., 1999) <http://www.ip.on.ca/web-site.eng/matters/
sum_pap/PAPERS/biometric.htm>.
142. See id. at § 4. In addition, some people, for religious or personal reasons, find submit-
ting to a biometric testing to be unacceptable. Even if the scan does not require a blood sample or
other physical invasion, it may encroach on other sensibilities. See Ontario Info. & Privacy
Comm'r, supra note 136, at text following note 168 ("Having to give something of themselves to be
identified is viewed as an affront to their dignity and a violation of their person. Certain biometric
techniques require touching a communal reader, which may be unacceptable to some, due to cul-
tural norms or religious beliefs.").
143. See Dutch Data Protection Authority (Registratiekamer et al.), supra note 137, §§ 2.2-
2.3.
144. See DNA Fingerprinting, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANCICA ONLINE <http://search.eb.com/
bol/topiceu=31233&sctn=l&pm=1> (noting that DNA is usually unique with "the only exception
being multiple individuals from a single zygote (e.g., identical twins)').
145. The FBI Combined Index DNA Indexing System ("CODIS") alone currently contains in-
formation on 38,000 people. Approximately 450,000 samples await processing. See EPIC, supra
note 36. But see Ng Kang-Chung, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 12, 1999, Legislators Fear
DNA Test Plans Open to Abuse, available in 1999 WL 2520961 (describing the Hong Kong legis-
lature's fears of"allowing police to take DNA samples from suspects too easily").
146. See EPIC, supra note 36.
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pile a database containing medical records, genetic information, and genea-
logical information for all Icelanders.147
4. Sense-enhanced searches.
Sense-enhanced searches rely on one or more technologies to detect that
which ordinarily could not be detected with un-aided human senses. These
searches differ from surveillance in public places because, with a few excep-
tions such as airport body searches, sense enhanced searches are not yet rou-
tine, perhaps because of the rarity or expense of the necessary equipment.
Instead, the typical sense-enhanced search is targeted at someone or some-
thing specific, or carried out at specific and usually temporary locations.
Unlike home or office monitoring, which usually requires equipment inside
the location of interest, many sense-enhanced searches allow someone on the
outside to see what is happening inside a building, a package, or even cloth-
ing. Because there is no "entry" as the term is commonly defined, nor a
physical intrusion, and because many of the technologies rely on emanations
that are not coerced by the observer, these technologies may be permissible
under both the Fourth Amendment and private law trespass law. Sense-
enhanced search technology is changing rapidly, raising doubts as to what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in a world where we are all
increasingly naked and living in transparent homes.
Governments appear to be the primary users of sense-enhanced searches,
but many of the technologies are moving into the private sector as prices de-
crease.
a. Looking down: satellite monitoring.
Once the sole property of governments, high-quality satellite photo-
graphs in the visible spectrum are now available for purchase. The sharpest
pictures on sale today are able to distinguish objects two meters long,148 with
a competing one-meter resolution service planned for later this year. 49
Meanwhile, governments are using satellites to regulate behavior. Satel-
lite tracking is being used to monitor convicted criminals on probation, pa-
role, home detention, or work release. Convicts carry a small tracking device
that receives coordinates from global positioning satellites ("GPS") and
147. Mannvemd, Association for Ethical Science, The Health-Sector Database Plans ii Ice-
land, July 7, 1998 <http://www.simnet.islmannvemdlenglishlarticles/27.11.1998_mannvemd
summary.html>.
148. See SP-2 High Resolution Satellite Imagery <http:Ilwww.spin-2.coml>.
149. The improved pictures will come from the Ikonos satellite. See Ikonos, Carterra Ortho
Products Technical Specs <http://www.spaceimaging.com/carterra/orthotechpan.htn>.
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communicates them to a monitoring center.150 The cost for this service is
low, about $12.50 per target per day.1SI
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom is considering the adoption of a GPS-
based system, already field tested in the Netherlands and Spain,152 to prevent
speeding. Cars would be fitted with GPS monitors that would pinpoint the
car's exact location, link with a computer built into the car containing a data-
base of national roads, identify the applicable speed limit, and instruct a gov-
ernor built into the vehicle to stop the fuel supply if the car exceeds a certain
speed. 53 GPS systems allow a receiver to determine its location by refer-
ence to satellites, but do not actually transmit the recipient's location to any-
one.154  The onboard computer could, however, permanently record
everywhere the car goes, if sufficient storage were provided. The United
Kingdom proposal also calls for making speed restrictions contextual, al-
lowing traffic engineers to slow down traffic in school zones, after accidents,
or during bad weather.155 This contextual control requires a means to load
updates into the computer; indeed, unless the United Kingdom wished to
freeze its speed limits for all time, some sort of update feature would be es-
sential. Data integrity validation usually relies upon two-way communica-
tion. Once the speed control system and a central authority are
communicating, the routine downloading of vehicle travel histories would
become a real possibility. And even without two-way communication, satel-
lite-control over a vehicle's fuel supply would allow immobilizing vehicles
for purposes other than traffic control. For example, cars could be stopped
for riot control or if being chased by police, parents would have a new way
of "grounding" children, and hackers would have a new target.
That a government can track a device designed to be visible by satellite
does not, of course, necessarily mean that an individual without one could be
tracked by satellite in the manner depicted by the film Enemy of the State.
However, a one-meter resolution suggests that it should be possible to track a
single vehicle if a satellite were able to provide sufficient images, and satel-
lite technology is improving rapidly.
150. See Joseph Rose, Satellite Offenders, WIRED, Jan. 13, 1999 <http://www.wired.com/
newsfnewsltechnology/story/17296.html>.
151. See Gary Fields, Satellite "Big Brother" Eyes Parolees, Apr. 8, 1999, USA TODAY, at
10A.
152. See Satellites in the Driving Seat, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 2000 <http.//newsvote.bbc.co.ukl
hi/english/uk/newsid_590000/590387.stm> (reporting that half of the users in the test said they
would be willing to adopt the system voluntarily).
153. See Jon Hibbs, Satellite Puts the Brake on Speeding Drivers, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 4, 2000
<http:llwww.telegraph.co.uk:80/et?a--00141005951983&rtmo=kLJAeZbp&atmo=kLJAeZbp&pg
--/et/00/l41sped04.htm1>; "Spy in the Sky" Targets Speeders, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 2000 <http://
newsvote.bbc.co.uk/hi/englishfuk/newsid 590000/590336.stm>.
154. See WATCHING ME, WATCHING YOU, supra note 61.
155. See Hibbs, supra note 153.
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The public record does not disclose how accurate secret spy satellites
might be, nor what parts of the spectrum they monitor other than visible
light. The routine privacy consequences of secret satellites is limited, be-
cause governments tend to believe that using the results in anything less than
extreme circumstances tends to disclose their capabilities. As the private
sector catches up with governments, however, technologies developed for
national security purposes will gradually become available for new uses.
b. Seeing through walls.
It may be that "the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress,
as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose,"5 6 but
the walls of that fortress are far more permeable today than ever before.
Suitably equipped observers can now draw informed conclusions about what
is occurring within a house without having to enter it. Most of these tech-
nologies are passive. They do not require the observer to shine a light or any
other particle or beam on the target; instead they detect preexisting emana-
tions.
Thermal imaging, for example, allows law enforcement to determine
whether a building has "hot spots." In several cases, law enforcement agen-
cies have argued that heat concentrated in one part of a building tends to in-
dicate the use of grow lights, which in turn (they argue) suggests the
cultivation of marijuana. The warrantless discovery of hot spots has been
used to justify the issuance of a warrant to search the premises. Although the
courts are not unanimous, most hold that passive thermal imaging that does
not reveal details about the inside of the home does not require a warrant.5 7
156. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604), quoted with approval in Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1999).
157. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the use
of a thermal imager did not require a warrant because it "did not expose any intimate details" of the
inside of a home, and therefore a privacy interest in dissipated heat was not one that society would
accept as "objectively reasonable"); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328-29 (11th Cir.
1995) (holding that a thermal imager search does not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853-55 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668,
669-70 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995-97 (1 1th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994); but see United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497,
1500-01 (10th Cir. 1995), aff'd en bane, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (raising the possibility that
thermal scans without a warrant violate the Fourth Amendment and arguing that other circuit courts
have "misframed" the Fourth Amendment inquiry); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 594 (Wash.
1994) (holding that a warrantless thermal image search violates State and Federal Constitutions).
For an analysis of the lower courts' thermal imaging cases, see Lisa Tuenge Hale, United States v.
Ford: The Eleventh Circuit Permits Unrestricted Police Use of Thermal Surveillance on Private
Property Without A Warrant, 29 GA. L. REv. 819, 833-45 (1995); Susan Moore, Does Heat Ema-
nate Beyond the Threshold?: Home Infrared Emissions, Remote Sensing, and the Fourth Amend-
ment Threshold, 70 CHi.-KENT L. Rsv. 803, 842-58 (1994); Lynne M. Pochurek, From the
Battlefront to the Homefront: Infrared Surveillance and the War on Drugs Place Privacy Under
Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 137, 151-59 (1994); Matthew L. Zabel, A High-Tech Assault on the
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The telephone is not the only electronic device that allows new forms of
monitoring. Computer monitors broadcast signals that can be replicated
from a considerable distance.I58 Computer programs and viruses can use
this capability to surreptitiously broadcast information other than what is
displayed on the screen. These emissions are so powerful that one of the
academics who first documented them suggested that Microsoft have its li-
censed programs "radiate a one-way function of its license serial number.
This would let an observer tell whether two machines were simultaneously
running the same copy of Word, but nothing more."159 Microsoft, however,
apparently was not interested in a copy protection scheme that would have
required it to employ a fleet of piracy detection monitors cruising the world's
highways or hallways. Users can protect against the crudest types of this
distance monitoring by employing "Tempest fonts." These special fonts will
protect the user's privacy by displaying to any eavesdropper a text different
from the one actually displayed on the users' screen.1 60
c. Seeing through clothes.
Passive millimeter wave imaging reads the electromagnetic radiation
emitted by an object.161 Much like an X-ray, this technology can specifically
identify the radiation spectrum of most objects carried on the person, even
those in pockets, under clothes, or in containers.162 It thus allows the user to
see through clothes, and conduct a "remote frisk" for concealed weapons, 63
or other contraband.164 Imagers are available as handheld scanners, visible
gateway scanners, or in hidden surveillance models.165
"Castle": Warrantless Thermal Surveillance ofPrivate Residences and the Fouith Amendment, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 267,282-87 (1995).
158. See Marcus J. Kuhn & Ross Anderson, Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using
Electromagnetic Emanations <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-mgk25/ih98-tempest.pdfr>.
159. Email from Ross Anderson to ukcrypto mailing list (Feb. 8, 1998) (available at
<http:/Vww.jya.com/soft-tempest.htm>).
160. Tempest-resistant fonts designed by Ross Anderson are available at
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.ukl-mgk25/st-fonts.zip>.
161. See generally Alyson L. Rosenberg, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New Weapon
in the Fight Against Crime or a Fourth Amendment fiolation?, 9 ALB. L.L Sci. & TECH. 135
(1998).
162. See Millivision, Security Applications <http:llwww.millivision.comlsecurity.html> Mer-
rik D. Bernstein, "Intimate Details": A Troubling New Fourth Amendment Standard for Govern-
ment Surveillance Techniques, 46 DUKE L.. 575, 600-04 (1996) (noting that although Millivision
can see through clothes it does not reveal anatomical details ofpersons scanned).
163. See Millivision, Concealed Weapon Detection <http:llwww.milivision.com/cwd.htnl>.
164. See Millivison, Contraband Detection <http.//www.millivision.com/contband.html>
("As an imaging system, millimeter wave sensors cannot determine chemical composition, but
when combined with advanced imaging software, they can provide valuable shape and location
information, helping to distinguish contraband from permitted items.").
165. See id. (containing links to various models).
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A similar product, which is not passive, uses low levels of X-rays to
screen individuals foi concealed weapons, drugs, and other contraband. The
makers of "BodySearceh" boast that two foreign government agencies are
using it for both detection and head-of-state security, and that a state prison
is using it as a substitute for strip searching prisoners. The United States
customs service is using it as an alternative to pat-down searches at JFK air-
port, prompting complaints from the ACLU. According to the ACLU,
"BodySearch" provides a picture of the outline of a human body, including
genitals: "If there is ever a place where a person has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, it is under their clothing."6 6 The sample photo provided by
BodySearch makers American Science and Engineering, Inc. is fairly re-
vealing.67 Still newer devices such as a radar skin scanner can distinguish
all anatomical features over one millimeter, making it possible to "see
through a person's clothing with such accuracy that it can scan someone
standing on the street and detect the diameter of a woman's nipples, or
whether a man has been circumcised."168
d. Seeing everything: smart dust.
Perhaps the ultimate privacy invasion would be ubiquitous miniature
sensors floating around in the air. Amazingly, someone is trying to build
them: The goal of the "smart dust" project is "to demonstrate that a com-
plete sensor/communication system can be integrated into a cubic millimeter
package" capable of carrying any one of a number of sensors. While the cur-
rent prototype is seven millimeters long (and does not work properly), the
engineers hope to meet their one cubic millimeter goal by 2001. At that size,
the "motes" would float on the breeze, and could work continuously for two
weeks, or intermittently for up to two years. A million dust motes would
have a total volume of only one liter.169
166. Deepti Hajela, Airport X-Ray Device Spurs Concerns, AP ONLINE, Dec. 29, 1999
(quoting testimony of ACLU legislative counsel Gregory T. Nojeim).
167. See <http:/216.149.33.140/images/pic body02lg.jpg> (showing sample BodySearch im-
age in which contours of body are discernable); see also SchNews May 1997, Public Enemy No.
One <http://www.gifford.co.uk/i-contactlgraphics/bodysearch.jpg> (reporting that privacy cam-
paigners dubbed invention "PubeMaster 2000"). U.S. Customs Public Affairs Officer Mike Flem-
ing admitted that the BodySearch produces quite graphic images and does detail genitalia, but noted
the image is more of a photographic negative than a positive. U.S. Custom's scans are done in a
private booth away from prying eyes, he said, and preformed by same-gender agents. See Sharon
Gerrie, X-Rated X-Rays May Bypass Las Vegas, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS (Jan. 24, 2000)
<http:/.206.27.179.171/newsstories/00012410n.html>.
168. Judy Jones, Look Ahead to the Year 2000: Electronic An Of The Law Is Getting Afore
High-Tech, COURIER-J. (Louisville, KY), Oct. 19, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5671879.
169. See KIus PISTER, JOE KAHN, BERNHARD BOSER & STEVE MORRIS, SMART DUST:
AUTONOMOUS SENSING AND COMMUNICATION IN A CUBIC MILLIMETER <http://robotics.eecs.
berkeley.edu/-pister/SmartDust>.
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Although funded by the Pentagon, the project managers foresee a large
number of potential civilian as well as military applications if they are able to
perfect their miniature sensor platform. Among the less incredible possibili-
ties they suggest are: battlefield surveillance, treaty monitoring, transporta-
tion monitoring, scud hunting, inventory control, product quality monitoring,
and smart office spaces. They admit, however, that the technology may have
a "dark side" for personal privacy. 70
II. RESPONDING TO PRIVACY-DESTROYING TECHNOLOGIES
The prospect of "smart dust," of cameras too small to see with the naked
eye, evokes David Brin's and Neal Stephenson's vision of a world without
privacy.171 As the previous discussion demonstrates, however, even without
ubiquitous microcameras, governments and others are deploying a wide vari-
ety of privacy-destroying technologies. These developments raise the imme-
diate question of the appropriate legal and social response.
One possibility is to just "get over it" and accept emerging realities. Be-
fore adopting this counsel of defeat, however, it seems prudent to explore the
extent to which the law offers strategies for resistance to data collection. The
next part of this article thus offers a survey of various proposals for a legal
response to the problem of ubiquitous personal data collection. Because any
legal reform designed to protect informational privacy arises in the context of
existing law, the discussion begins by outlining some of the major con-
straints that must shape any practicable response to privacy-destroying tech-
nologies.
A. The Constraints
An effective response to privacy-destroying technologies, in the United
States at least, is constrained by three factors: first, market failure caused by
myopic, imperfectly informed consumers; second, a clear, correct vision of
the First Amendment; and third, fear.
1. The economics ofprivacy myopia.
Under current ideas of property in information, consumers are in a poor
legal position to complain about the sale of data concerning themselves.1 72
170. See id.
171. See BRIN, supra note 1I; NEAL STEPHENsoN, THE DIAMOND AGE (1995) (imagining a
future in which nanotechnology is so pervasive that buildings must filter air in order to exclude
nanotechnology spies and attackers).
172. For an extreme example, see Moore v. Regents of California, 793 P.2d 479,488-97 (Cal.
1990) (holding that a patient had no cause of action, under property law, against his physician or
others who used the patient's cells for medical research without his permission).
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The original alienation of personal data may have occurred with the con-
sumer's acquiescence or explicit consent. Every economic transaction has at
least two parties; in most cases, the facts of the transaction belong equally to
both.173 As evidenced by the existence of the direct mail industry, both sides
to a transaction generally are free to sell details about the transaction to any
interested third party.
There are exceptions to the default rule of joint and several ownership of
the facts of a transaction, but they are relatively minor. Sometimes the law
creates a special duty of confidentiality binding one of the parties to silence.
Examples include fiduciary duties and a lawyer's duty to keep a client's con-
fidence.174 Overall, the number of transactions in which confidentiality is the
legal default is relatively small compared to the total number of transactions
in the United States.
In theory, the parties to a transaction can always contract for confidenti-
ality. This is unrealistic due because consumers suffer from privacy myopia:
they will sell their data too often and too cheaply. Modest assumptions about
consumer privacy myopia suggest that even Americans who place a high
value on information privacy will sell their privacy bit by bit for frequent
flyer miles. Explaining this requires a brief detour into stylized microeco-
nomics.
Assume that a representative consumer engages in a large number of
transactions. Assume further that the basic consumer-related details of these
transactions-consumer identity, item purchased, cost of item, place and
time of sale-are of roughly equivalent value across transactions for any
consumer and between consumers, and that the marginal value of the data
produced by each transaction is low on its own. In other words, assume we
are limiting the discussion to ordinary consumer transactions, not extraordi-
nary private ones, such as the purchase of anticancer drugs. Now assume
that aggregation adds value: Once a consumer profile reaches a given size,
the aggregate value of that consumer profile is greater than the sum of the
value of the individual data. Most heroically, assume that once some thresh-
old has been reached the value of additional data to a potential profiler re-
mains linear and does not decline. Finally, assume that data brokers or
profile compilers are able to buy consumer data from merchants at low trans-
actions costs, because the parties are repeat players who engage in numerous
transactions involving substantial amounts of data. Consumers, however, are
unaware of the value of their aggregated data to a profile compiler. With one
173. See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polls: The EU Directive on the Protection of
Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 446 (1995) (noting the traditional view, now retreating in
Europe, that "data... were perfectly normal goods and thus had to be treated in exactly the same
way as all other products and services.").
174. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Cannon 4 (1999); ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6. (1999).
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possible exception, the assumption that the value of consumer data never
declines, these all seem to be very tame assumptions.
In an ordinary transaction, a consumer will value a datum at its marginal
value in terms of lost privacy. In contrast, a merchant, who is selling it to a
profiler, will value it at or near its average value as part of a profile. Be-
cause, according to our assumptions, the average value of a single datum is
greater than the marginal value of that datum (remember, aggregation adds
value), a consumer will always be willing to sell data at a price a merchant is
willing to pay.
The ultimate effect of consumer privacy myopia depends upon a number
of things. First, it depends on the intrusiveness of the profile. If the profile
creates a privacy intrusion that is noticeably greater than disclosing an occa-
sional individual fact-that is, if aggregation not only adds value but aggra-
vation-then privacy myopia is indeed a problem. I suspect that this is, in
fact, the case and that many people share my intuition. It is considerably
more intrusive to find strangers making assumptions about me, be they true
or painfully false, than it is to have my name and address residing in a data-
base restricted to the firms from which I buy. On the other hand, if people
who object to being profiled are unusual, and aggregation does not cause
harm to most people's privacy, the main consequence of privacy myopia is
greatly reduced. For some, it is only distributional. Consumers who place a
low value on their information privacy-people for whom their average
valuation is less than the average valuation of a profiler-would have agreed
to sell their privacy even if they were aware of the long-run consequences.
The only harm to them is that they have not extracted the highest price pos-
sible. But consumers who place a high value on information privacy will be
more seriously harmed by their information myopia. Had they been aware of
the average value of each datum, they might have preferred not to sell.
Unfortunately, if the marginal value75 to the consumer of a given datum
is small, then the value of not disclosing that datum will in most cases be
lower than either the cost of negotiating a confidentiality clause (if that op-
tion even exists), or the cost of forgoing the entire transaction.176 Thus, in
the ordinary case, absent anything terribly revealing about the datum, privacy
clauses are unlikely to appear in standard form contracts, and consumers will
accept this.177 Furthermore, changing the law to make consumers the default
owners of information about their economic activity is unlikely to produce
175. Or even the average value to a well-informed consumer.
176. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Pri-
vale Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 519-23 (1995); Sovem, supra note 22, at 1033 (arguing that
"businesses have both the incentive and the ability to increase consumers' transaction costs in pro-
tecting their privacy and that some marketers do in fact inflate those costs.").
177. See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense
ofPrivacy, 84 GEO. L.. 2381, 2413 (1996).
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large numbers of confidentiality clauses in the agora. In most cases, all it
will do is move some of the consumer surplus from information buyers to
information producers or sellers as the standard contracts forms add a term in
which the consumer conveys rights to the information in exchange for a fre-
quent flyer mile or two.
In short, if consumers are plausibly myopic about the value of a datum-
focusing on its marginal value rather than its average value, which is difficult
to measure-but profilers are not and the data are more valuable in aggre-
gate, then there will be substantial over-disclosure of personal data even
when consumers care about their informational privacy.
If this stylized story is even somewhat accurate, it has unfortunate impli-
cations for many proposals to change the default property rules regarding
ownership of personal data in ordinary transactions. The sale will tend to
happen even if the consumer has a sole entitlement to the data. It also sug-
gests that European-style data protection rules should have only a limited
effectiveness, primarily for highly sensitive personal data. The European
Union's data protection directive allows personal data to be collected for re-
use and resale if the data subject agrees;178 the privacy myopia story suggests
that customers will ordinarily agree except when disclosing particularly sen-
sitive personal facts with a high marginal value.
On the other hand, the privacy myopia story suggests several questions
for further research. For example, the myopia story suggests that we need to
know how difficult it is to measure the value of privacy and, once that value
has been calculated, how difficult it is to educate consumers to value data at
its average rather than marginal value. Can information provide a corrective
lense?179 Or, perhaps consumers already have the ability to value the privacy
interest in small amounts of data if they consider the long term consequences
of disclosure.
Consumers sometimes have an interest in disclosure of information. For
example, proof of credit-worthiness tends to improve the terms upon which
lenders offer credit. The myopia story assumes this feature away. It would
be interesting to try to measure the relative importance of privacy and disclo-
sure as intermediate and final goods. If the intermediate good aspect of in-
formational privacy and disclosure substantially outweighed their final good
aspect, the focus on blocking disclosure advocated in this article might be
misguided. European data-protection rules, which focus on requiring trans-
178. See Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Generational Development of Data Protection in
Europe, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 219, 232 (Philip B. Agre & Marc
Rotenberg eds., 1997).
179. For an innovative, if slightly cute, attempt to teach children about privacy, see Media
Awareness Network, Privacy Playground: The First Adventures of the 7hree Little CyberPigs
<http://wvw.media-awareness.ca/englcpigslcpigs.htmn>.
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parency regarding the future uses of gathered data, might be the best strat-
egy.
It would also be useful to know much more about the economics of data
profiling. In particular, it would be helpful to know how much data it takes
to make a profile valuable-at what point does the whole exceed the sum of
the data parts? Additionally, it would be important to know whether profil-
ers regularly suffer from data overload, and to what extent there are dimin-
ishing returns to scale for a single subject's personal data. Furthermore, it
could be useful to know whether there might be increasing returns to scale as
the number of consumers profiled increases. If there are increasing returns to
scale over any relevant part of the curve, the marginal consumer would be
worth extra. It might follow that in an efficient market, profilers would be
willing to pay more for data about the people who are most concerned about
informational privacy.
There has already been considerable work on privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies for electronic transactions. S0 There seems to be a need for more
research, however, to determine which types of transactions are best suited to
using technologies such as information intermediaries. The hardest work,
will involve finding ways to apply privacy-enhancing technologies to those
transactions that are not naturally suited to them.
Perhaps the most promising avenue is to design contracts and technolo-
gies that undercut the assumptions in the myopia story. For example, one
might seek to lower the transaction costs of modifying standard form con-
tracts, or of specifying restrictions on reuse of disclosed data. The lower the
cost of contracting for privacy, the greater the chance that such a cost will be
less than the marginal value of the data (note that merely lowering it below
average cost fails to solve the underlying problem, because sales will still
happen in that price range). If technologies, such as P3p,I8 reduce the mar-
ginal transactions costs involved in negotiating the release of personal data to
near zero, even privacy myopics will be able to express their privacy prefer-
ences in the P3P-compliant part of the marketplace.
180. See, e.g., INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMM'R/ONTARIO, CANADA & REGIS-
TRATIEKAMER [Dutch Data Protection Authority], THE NETHERLANDS, I PRIVACY-ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES: THE PATH TO ANONYMITY (1995) <http://www.ipe.on.calwebsite.ups/matters/
sum_pappapers!anon-e.htm>.
181. P3P is the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project, a set of standards, architecture, and
grammar to allow complying machines to make requests for personal data and have them answered
subject to predetermined privacy preferences set by a data subject. See Joseph M. Reagle, Jr., P3P
and Privacy on the Web FAQ <http://www.w3.org/P3P/P3FAQ.htrl> ("P3P [allows] [wieb sites to
express their privacy practices and enable users to exercise preferences over those practices. P3P
products will allow users to be informed of site practices (in both machine and human readable
formats), to delegate decisions to their computer when appropriate, and allow users to tailor their




The First Amendment affects potential privacy-enhancing rules in at
least three ways: (1) most prohibitions on private data-gathering in public
(i.e. surveillance) risk violating the First Amendment (conversely, most gov-
ernment surveillance in public appears to be unconstrained by the Fourth
Amendment)182; (2) the First Amendment may impose limits on the extent to
which legislatures may restrict the collection and sale of personal data in
connection with commercial transactions; and (3) the First Amendment right
to freedom of association imposes some limits on the extent to which the
government may observe and profile citizens, if only by creating a right to
anonymity in some cases. 183
One of the arguments advanced most strenuously in favor of the propo-
sition that the privacy battle is now lost to ubiquitous surveillance is that "in-
formation wants to be free," and that once collected, data cannot in practice
be controlled. Although the most absolutist versions of this argument tend to
invoke data havens or distributed database technology, the argument also
draws some force from the First Amendment-although perhaps a little less
than it used to.
a. The First Amendment in public places.
Perhaps the critical question shaping the legal and social response to new
surveillance technology is the extent to which the government can limit the
initial collection of personal data in public. Once information is collected, it
is hard to control, and almost impossible to erase once it gets into distributed
databases. Legal rules prohibiting data collection in public are not the only
possible response; defenses against collection might also include educating
people as to the consequences of disclosure or deploying countertechnologies
such as scramblers, detectors, or masks.18 4 Unlike a legal solution, however,
most technological responses involve shifting costs to the data subject. The
cost of compliance with laws restricting data collection is likely to fall on the
observer, at least initially. The difficulty is writing rules that are consistent
with both the First Amendment and basic policies of freedom.
Professor Jerry Kang recently proposed and defended a statute limiting
the collection of personal information in eyberspace. As seen from the dis-
182. "[l]fpolice are lawfully in a position from which they viewv an object, if its incriminating
character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object,
they may seize it without a warrant." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); see also
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983).
183. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Legal Issues in Anonymity and Pseudonymity, 15
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 113 (1999).
184. On masks, however, see text accompanying notes 301-303 infra (discussing antimask
laws in several states).
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cussion in part I, there is no doubt that the collection of personal information
in cyberspace is already a serious threat to information privacy, and that this
threat will continue to grow by leaps and bounds. Professor Kang's statute
would be a valuable contribution to information privacy if it were adopted.
But even if its economic importance is growing, cyberspace is still only a
small part of most daily lives. Part I demonstrates that a great deal of the
threat to information privacy is rooted firmly in "meatspace" (the part of life
that is not cyberspace). The problem is considerably more general. Indeed,
cyberspace privacy and meatspace privacy are related, since the data drawn
from both will be matched in databases. The Kang proposal, already un-
likely to be adopted by a legislature, would need to be radically generalized
to meatspace just to protect the status quo ante. Even if a legislature could
be persuaded to adopt such a radically pro-privacy initiative, it is not at all
clear that such an ambitious attempt to create privacy rights in public places
would be constitutional.
The core question is whether a legislature could constitutionally change
the default rules, which hold that what is visible is public, in order to in-
crease informational privacy. Current doctrine does not make clear the ex-
tent to which Congress may seek to preserve, or even expand, zones of
privacy in public places (or informational privacy relating to transactions) by
making it an offense to use a particular technology to view or record others.
This may be because attempts to expand the zone of privacy in the United
States by legislation are still relatively rare. Prohibiting the use of technolo-
gies that are not already commonplace prevents the public from becoming
desensitized, and it ensures a reasonable expectation of being able to walk in
public without being scanned by them. Similarly, prohibiting the use of
commonplace technologies also creates a (legally) reasonable expectation
that others will follow the law; and that restricted technologies will not be
used. At some undefined point, perhaps quite close to its inception, any such
attempt will begin to intrude on core First Amendment values.
In peacetime, the First Amendment allows only the lightest restrictions
upon the ordinary gathering of information in public places (or upon repeat-
ing of such information).185 Other than cases protecting bodily integrity, the
constitutional right to privacy is anemic, especially when compared to the
First Amendment's protection of the rights to gather and disseminate infor-
mation. This is not necessarily a bad thing, because most rules designed to
protect privacy in public places would probably have a substantial harmful
effect upon news gathering and public debate. Nevertheless, there are a few
areas where light privacy-enhancing regulation might not impinge upon core
First Amendment values. There are also areas where laws that actively hin-
der privacy might be reformed.
185. See note 191 infra.
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The constitutional status of a regulation of data collection has implica-
tions for the regulation of its subsequent uses. If it were unconstitutional to
impose a restriction upon the initial collection, then it would be difficult to
impose constitutionally acceptable limitations on downstream users of the
data. When the government is not the data proprietor, the constitutional jus-
tification for a rule limiting, for example, the dissemination of mall camera
photos or the sale of consumer profiles, will be closely tied, and sometimes
identical, to the justification for banning the data collection in the first place.
If restrictions upon the initial collection could be imposed constitutionally,
then justifications for imposing conditions that run with the data are easy to
see. If, on the other hand, the data were lawfully acquired, justifying rules
that prevent it from being shared (or, perhaps, even used by the initial col-
lector) is far less onerous if one can categorize the dissemination of the data
as the shipment of a data-good in commerce rather than as a publication or
other speech act.
The recent and unanimous Supreme Court decision in Reno v. Condon186
could be read to suggest that the act of transmitting personal data for com-
mercial purposes is something less than even commercial speech. In Con-
don, the Court upheld the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA") against
claims asserted under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In so doing, the
Court agreed with the petitioner that "personal, identifying information that
the DPPA regulates is a 'thin[g] in interstate commerce,' and that the sale or
release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore a proper sub-
ject of congressional regulation" under Congress's Commerce Clause pow-
ers. 187 The circumstances and posture of Condon suggest, however, that this
reading, which would be a radical break with existing First Amendment
principles, is not justified.
Gathering information in public. The First Amendment protects the
freedom of speech and of the press, but does not explicitly mention the right
to gather information. However, both the Supreme Court and appellate
courts have interpreted the First Amendment to encompass a right to gather
information.188 The right is not unlimited. It does not, for example, create an
affirmative duty on the government to make information available.189
186. 120 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2000) (upholding Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994 & Supp. III), against claim that it violated federalism principles of Con-
stitution).
187. Id. at 671 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).
188. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972), the Court acknowledged a First
Amendment right to receive information, but said that the right must bow to Congress' plenary
power to exclude aliens. See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305-07 (1965)
(invalidating a statutory requirement that foreign mailings of "communist political propaganda" be
delivered only upon request by the addressee); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-49
(1943) (invalidating a municipal ordinance forbidding door-to-door distribution of handbills as
violative of the recipients' First Amendment rights); The Rights of the Public and the Press to
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As a general matter, if a person can see it in public, she can write about it
and talk about it. It does not inevitably follow that because she may share
her natural sense impressions, or her written recollections, she may also
photograph it or videotape events and then publish mechanically recorded
images and sounds. Most courts that have examined the issue, however,
have held that she may do so, subject only to very slight limitations imposed
by privacy torts.190 "[C]ourts have consistently refused to consider the taking
of a photograph as an invasion of privacy where it occurs in a public for a
[sic]."' 9' "Thus, in order for an invasion of privacy to occur, '[t]he invasion
or intrusion must be of something which the general public would not be free
to view. '2192
Perhaps it might be constitutional to prohibit the use of devices that see
through clothes on the theory that there is a limited First Amendment excep-
tion allowing bans on outrageous assaults upon personal modesty. On the
other hand, the government's use of passive wave imaging, which see
through clothes, suggests that the executive branch believes either that there
is no constitutional problem, or that the problem can be solved by offering
subjects the alternative of an (equally intrusive?) patdown search.193 Or, per-
haps, the government's ability to ban intrusive monitoring sweeps more
broadly. The correct doctrinal answer is unclear because there have been no
privacy-enhancing statutes seeking to block systematic data collection in
Gather Ihifonnation, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1506 (1974) ("[W]hen the public has a right to re-
ceive information, it would seem to have a [Fjirst [A]mendment right to acquire that information.").
189. See Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 120 S. Ct. 483, 489-90
(1999); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
190. See generally Phillip E. Hassaman, Annotation, Taking Unauthorized Photographs as
Invasion of Privacy, 86 A.L.R.3d 374 (1978). The classic case is Daily Times Democrat v. Gra-
ham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964), reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "Even in a
public place, however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack
of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there
is intrusion upon these matters." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt C (1977).
191. United States v. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85,90 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding no invasion of
privacy where plaintiffs were photographed on a city sidewalk in plain view of the public eye); see
also Jackson v. Playboy Enter., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F.
Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (no invasion of privacy when photographing plaintiff at "a public
place or a place otherwise open to the public"); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1281 (Nev. 1995) (no invasion of privacy filming backstage
before live performance); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988) (no invasion of privacy
when photographing "in an open place and in a common workplace where there were a number of
other people"); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979) (holding that the
First Amendment protects the right to take and publish photos of a house from a public street);
Mark v. KING Broad. Co., 618 P.2d 512, 519 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd sub nona. Mark v. Seat-
tie Times, 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981) (no invasion of privacy when filming interior of pharmacy
from the exterior of the building).
192. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp.2d at 90 (quoting Mark, 618 P.2d at 519).
193. The United States Customs offers travelers the option of choosing a pat down search in-




public places. Ultimately, the answer may turn on just how outrageous high-
tech surveillance becomes. Meanwhile, however, one must look to privacy
tort cases in which the First Amendment was raised as a defense in order to
get an indication as to the possible sweep of the First Amendment in public
view cases.
Tort-based attempts to address the use of privacy-destroying technolo-
gies in public places tend to focus either on the target, the type of informa-
tion, or whether a person might reasonably expect not to be examined by
such a technology. Unless they seek to define personal data as the property
of the data subject, approaches that focus on the targeted individual tend to
ask whether there is something private or secluded about the place in which
the person was located that might create a reasonable expectation of privacy.
If there was not, the viewing is usually lawful, and the privacy tort claim
fails either because of the First Amendment or because the court says that the
viewing is not a tort. Cases that focus on this type of information are usually
limited to outrageous fact situations, such looking under clothes.194 Cases
that focus on reasonable expectations are the most likely to find that new
technologies can give rise to a privacy tort, but these expectations are notori-
ously unstable: The more widely a technology is deployed and used, the less
reasonable the expectation not to be subjected to it. Thus, for example, ab-
sent statutory change, courts would be unlikely to find a reasonable expecta-
tion of not being photographed in public, although it does not necessarily
follow that one has no reasonable objection to being on camera all the time.
General regulation of new technologies such as thermal imaging or pas-
sive wave imaging seems unproblematic on First Amendment grounds so
long as the regulation were to apply to all uses. The legislature can ban a
technology that happens to be useful for news gathering if it does so through
a law of general application, and the ban is reasonably tailored to achieve
some legitimate objective. Privacy is surely such an objective. There are
limits: It is doubtful, for example, that a ban on pens and pencils ostensibly
designed to prevent note-taking in public would survive very long. On the
other hand, it might well be constitutional to prohibit using, or even pos-
sessing, some devices that enhance natural sensory perceptions on privacy
grounds.195 Indeed, federal regulations already criminalize the sale of vari-
ous types of spy gear.9 6
194. See note 191 supra.
195. Cf. Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Li-
abilityfor Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. RaV. 989, 1063 (1995) (making a similar distinc-
tion in connection with a privacy tort and proposing that "most situations involving actionable
public intrusions would involve the defendant using some form of technological device (e.g., video
camcorder, single-frame camera, audio recording device, binoculars, telescope, night vision scope)
to view and/or record the plaintiff").
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(a)-(b) (1986) (prohibiting mailing, manufacturing, assembling,
possessing, or selling of "any electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to
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Whether the ban could be crafted to apply only to use or possession in
public places is more dubious, because this cuts more closely against the
First Amendment. Pragmatically, the results in court may depend upon the
currency of the technology. It is inconceivable, for example, that a ban on
capturing all photographic images in public could possibly be squared with
the First Amendment, any more than could a ban on carrying a notebook and
a pencil. Photography and television have become so much a part of ordi-
nary life, as well as news gathering and reporting, that such a ban would
surely be held to violate the freedom of the press and of speech, no matter
how weighty the public interest in privacy.197 Possibly, however, a more
limited ban might be crafted to allow news gathering, but not twenty-four-
hour surveillance. Such a rule might, for example, limit the number of im-
ages of a particular place per hour, day, or week, although lines would in-
evitably be difficult to draw.198 A more practical rule, perhaps easier to
enforce, would distinguish among various technologies.
know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications," so long as there is a connection with
interstate commerce). The section also bans advertising such devices unless for official use only.
See id. § 2512(c).
197. Cf Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1963) (rejecting an invasion of pri-
vacy claim because "all of the surveillances took place in the open on public thoroughfares where
appellant's activities could be observed by passers-by. To this extent appellant has exposed herself
to public observation and therefore is not entitled to the same degree of privacy that she would
enjoy within the confines of her own home"); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474,
478 (Ala. 1964) (relying on Foster v. Manchester for the proposition that it is not "such an invasion
to take his photograph in such a place, since this amounts to nothing more than making a record, not
differing essentially from a full written description of a public sight which anyone present would be
free to see").
198. The constitutionality of limits on data gathering in public places may be tested by anti-
paparazzi statutes. The statute recently adopted in California suggests how such a law might look,
although the California statute artfully avoids the interesting constitutional issues. The key parts of
the statute state:
b) A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts to cap-
ture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound re-
cording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity
under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the
use of a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass,
if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved
without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device was used.
(e) Sale, transmission, publication, broadcast, or use of any image or recording of the type, or
under the circumstances, described in this section shall not itself constitute a violation of this
section, nor shall this section be construed to limit all other rights or remedies of plaintiff in
law or equity, including, but not limited to, the publication of private facts.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b), (e) (West 1999). By limiting the offense to invasions offensive to a
reasonable person, where there was already a reasonable expectation of privacy, and exempting
republishers, the statute avoids the hard issues. See generally Privacy, Technology, and the Cali-
fornia "Anti-paparazzi" Statute, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1367 (1999); Andrew D. Morton, Much Ado
About Newsgatherhg: Personal Privacy, Law Enforcement, and the Law of Unintended Conse-
quencesforAnti-paparazziLegislation, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1435 (1999).
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Disseminating accurate information. Data collection becomes much less
attractive if there are fewer buyers. One way to reduce the number of buyers
is to make it illegal to buy, use, or reveal the respective data. Although the
issue is not settled, there are good reasons to believe that the First Amend-
ment would forbid most legislation criminalizing the dissemination or use of
accurate information. 99 While good for free speech, it makes any ban on
data collection much more difficult to enforce. Conversely, if it is constitu-
tional to penalize downstream uses of certain data, or even retention or pub-
lication, then enforcement of a collection ban becomes easier, and the
incentives to violate the rule decrease.
The case for the constitutionality of a ban on the dissemination of some
forms of accurate collected personal data is not negligible. It has long been
assumed that sufficiently great government interests allow the legislature to
criminalize the publication of certain special types of accurate information.
Even prior restraint, and subsequent criminal prosecution, might be a con-
stitutionally acceptable reaction to the publication of troop movements, or
other similar information that might aid an enemy, during armed conflict.20D
In peacetime, copyright protections are justified by a specific constitutional
derogation from the general principle of freedom of speech. 201 Some highly
regulated industries, such as the securities industry, heavily restrict the
speech of individuals, such as financial advisors or those with market-
sensitive information, although the constitutionality of those rules is itself
subject to some doubt and debate. 202 Generally, however, most truthful dis-
closures in the absence of a specific contractual duty to keep silent have usu-
ally been considered to be constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court's decisions do not give blanket First Amendment
protection to the publication of information acquired legally. Instead they
have noted "[t]he tension between the right which the First Amendment ac-
cords to a free press, on the one hand, and the protections which various stat-
utes and common-law doctrines accord to personal privacy against the
199. "Regulations that suppress the truth are no less troubling because they target objectively
verifiable information." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996); see also
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (holding that law abridging brewer's right
to provide accurate information to public about the alcoholic content of malt beverages is uncon-
stitutional). See also text accompanying notes 205-220 infra.
200. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("No one would question
but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.").
201. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
202. See Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp.2d 464, 482 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding a First Amend-
ment challenge to § 6M(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6m(l) (amended 1994), as
applied to publishers of books, newsletters, Internet websites, instruction manuals, and computer
software providing information, analysis, and advice on commodity futures trading, because speech




publication of truthful information, on the other ... "203 But, other than in
cases involving intellectual property rights or persons with special duties of
confidentiality, 204 the modem Court has struck down all peacetime restric-
tions on publishing true information that have come before it. The Court has
kept open the theoretical possibility that a sufficiently compelling govern-
ment interest might justify penalizing the publication of true statements. But,
when faced with what might appear to be fairly compelling interests, such as
protecting the privacy of rape victims, the Court has found the privacy inter-
ests insufficient to overcome the First Amendment.205 This pattern suggests
that a compelling interest would have to be weighty indeed to overcome First
Amendment values, and that most, if not all, privacy claims would fail to
meet the standard. As the Supreme Court stated in Smith v. Daily Mail Pub-
lishing Company, "state action to punish the publication of truthful informa-
tion seldom can satisfy constitutional standards."206 Furthermore, "if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public sig-
nificance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of
the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest or-
der."207
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court considered a state statute
making it a "misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of a
rape victim."208 The Court held that, despite the very private nature of the
information, the First Amendment protected the broadcasting of the name of
a deceased, seventeen-year-old rape victim, because the reporter obtained the
information from open public records. Relying upon § 867 of the Restate-
ment of Torts by analogy, the Court noted that "the interests in privacy fade
when the information involved already appears on the public record."209
Then, in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court struck
down a state statute that criminalized the publication of the names of judges
who were subject to confidential judicial disciplinary proceedings.210 Al-
though the newspaper received the information from someone who had no
203. Id. at 530.
204. E.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-15 (1980) (holding that government
could enforce secrecy contract with former CIA agent); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663
(1991) (holding that a confidential source could recover damages for publisher's breach of promise
of confidentiality).
205. In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979), the Court protected informational
privacy interests in holding that the National Labor Relations Board could not compel a company to
disclose results of psychological tests on individual employees to a union without the employees'
consent. The Court held that, under federal labor law, the employees' right to privacy outweighed
the burden on the union despite the union's assertion that it needed the data.
206. 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979).
207. Id. at 103; quoted with approval in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 524 (1989).
208. 420 U.S. 469,472(1975).
209. Id. at 494-95.
210. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
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right to disclose it, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment barred
criminal prosecution of a newspaper for publishing accurate information
about a matter of public concern. The Court noted, however, that the case
did not involve a person with an obligation of confidentiality nor did it in-
volve stolen information: "We are not here concerned with the possible ap-
plicability of the statute to one who secures the information by illegal means
and thereafter divulges it."211 And, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
the Court said that the First Amendment protected a newspaper that lawfully
interviewed witnesses, obtained the names of juvenile offenders, and then
published those names in violation of a state statute requiring prior leave of
court to do so. 212 Although the Court struck down the statute, it left open the
possibility that publication of true and lawfully obtained information might
be prohibited "to further an interest more substantial than is present here."213
Similarly, in Florida Star v. BJ.F., the Court held that the First Amendment
barred damages against a newspaper that published the name of a rape victim
that it had lawfully acquired.214
More recently, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court struck down a
statute preventing brewers from stating the alcohol content of beer, even
though the Court found that the rule regulated commercial speech and thus
was subject to less exacting scrutiny than regulations upon other types of
speeCh.215
Thus, although the Supreme Court has "carefully eschewed reaching
th[e] ultimate question" of whether truthful publications of news can ever be
banned, or even the narrower question of "'whether truthful publications may
ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability' for invading 'an area of pri-
vacy,"' 216 its decisions suggest that if there is a category of truthful speech
that can constitutionally be banned, it is small indeed. The rule remains that
"state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can
satisfy constitutional standards."217
The Supreme Court's decisions leave open the possibility that the First
Amendment might apply more strongly when facts are legally acquired, as
opposed to originating in the illegal actions of another. Legally acquired
facts have the highest protection: "[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
211. Id at837.
212. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
213. Id. at 103.
214. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
215. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), a
fractured Court overturned Rhode Island's ban on truthful advertising of the retail price of alcoholic
beverages.
216. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532-33 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,491
(1975)).
217. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 102.
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constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to fur-
ther a state interest of the highest order."21s Of the cases discussed above,
only Landmark Communications involved a leak of information by someone
with a legal duty to maintain its confidentiality. That case could be read to
depend upon the heightened First Amendment protection for reporting upon
important public issues, such as the honesty of judges.
Thus, the Supreme Court's cases are unclear as to whether a ban on the
publication of illegally acquired information could fall within the presumably
small class of regulations of truthful speech that satisfy constitutional stan-
dards. Whether it is ever possible to ban the publication of truthful informa-
tion is unclear because the Court has never defined a "state interest of the
highest order" 219 and because it has never decided whether illegally acquired
information is (1) contraband per se, (2) contraband so long as a reasonable
recipient should have known that it was illegally acquired, or (3) not contra-
band when laundered sufficiently, thus allowing publication under the pro-
tections of the First Amendment.220 Which of the these is the law will have a
great impact upon any attempt to regulate technologies of surveillance, and
profiling technologies generally, because it affects how easily data can be
laundered.221
A recent divergence between two circuits suggests that the Supreme
Court may be asked to decide whether truthful information, obtained legally
by the ultimate recipient, can nonetheless be contraband because it was
originally acquired illegally. The D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit recently
reached opposite conclusions regarding the potential liability of a third party
receiver of information that was illegally acquired by a second party. In both
cases the information was an illegally intercepted telephone conversation on
a matter of public interest; in both cases the information was ultimately
218. Id. at 103; see also Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532-33 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at
103, with approval).
219. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
220. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534 n.8 (citations omitted):
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been
acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the
unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised but not defini-
tively resolved in New York Times Co. v. United States, and reserved in Landmark Communi-
cations. We have no occasion to address it here.
221. Washington is notoriously leaky. Except for the rare prior restraint cases involving na-
tional security such as New York Times v United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon pa-
pers" case), and United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (the H-
bomb case), the government's unbroken practice is to either ignore leaks, or, occasionally, to seek
to impose after-the-fact criminal sanctions on the leakers but not on the press. See L. A. Powe, Jr.,
Mass Communications and the First Amendment: An Overview, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53,
57-58 (1992) ("It has been almost twenty years and five administrations since Branzburg v. Hayes
held that there is no general first amendment privilege for reporters who wish to protect their confi-
dential sources. Yet there has not been a single subpoena to trace an inside-the-Beltway leak of
information .... .') (citation omitted).
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passed to news media. In Boehner v. McDermott,22 the D.C. Circuit held
that a Congressman who acted as a conduit for a tape between the interceptor
and a newspaper could be prosecuted for violating the Wiretapping Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2511.223 The D.C. Circuit held that the prohibition on disclosure by
third parties who had reason to know that the information had been illegally
acquired was justified because: "Here, the 'substantial governmental inter-
est' 'unrelated to the suppression of free expression' is evident."224 The
Wiretapping Act, the D.C. Circuit suggested, increases the freedom of
speech because "[e]avesdroppers destroy the privacy of conversations. The
greater the threat of intrusion, the greater the inhibition on candid exchanges.
Interception itself is damaging enough. But the damage to free speech is all
the more severe when illegally intercepted communications may be distrib-
uted with impunity."225 In reaching this conclusion, the court characterized
Congressman McDermott's action in being a conduit from the eavesdropper
to the media as being a combination of speech and conduct.226 Judge
Randolph characterized his act of handing over the tape as being akin to re-
ceiving, and passing on, stolen property.2 7 Judge Ginsburg concluded that
Congressman McDermott's conduct was outside the Florida Star rule-that
publishing truthful speech can only be punished if there is a state interest of
the "highest order"228--because he knowingly and "unlawfully obtained" the
tape. Intermediate scrutiny was therefore appropriate, and the statute could
survive that test.229 Judge Sentelle dissented on the grounds that the Florida
Star rule applied and compelled strict scrutiny. The third-party provisions of
the Wiretapping Act failed this more exacting test because they were not a
222. 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Judge Randolph authored the court's opinion, with Judge
Ginsburg concurring in the judgment and with parts of the opinion. Judge Sentelle dissented.
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)-(d), creating civil and criminal causes of action against any-
one who:
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of
any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the infor-
mation was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in
violation of this subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through
the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection
224. Boehner, 191 F.3d at 468.
225. Id.
226. See Id. at 466-67 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 291 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), for propo-
sition that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inci-
dental limitations on First Amendment freedoms").
227. See Id. at 469.
228. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,524 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
229. See Boehner, 191 F.3d at 480 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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content-neutral regulations.230 Judge Sentelle also specifically disagreed
with the majority's assertion that, as he put it, the government may punish a
"publisher of information [who] has obtained the information in question in a
manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully."231
Although he conceded that the state interest in protecting the privacy of
communications was compelling, he disagreed that a blanket ban on third-
party uses was narrowly tailored to serve that end.232
The Third Circuit also divided 2-1, but this time a majority saw the issue
much like Judge Sentelle. Bartnicki v. Popper involved a tape of a cellular
telephone conversation between two members of a teachers' union who were
engaged in contentious pay negotiations with their school district. Someone
recorded a conversation in which the two union members discussed going to
the homes of school members and "blow[ing] off their front porches."233 An
unknown party left the tape in the mailbox of Jack Yocum, an opponent of
the teachers' union, who then took it to the press.23 4
On an interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit held 2-1 that Yocum (the
conduit) and the subsequent publishers were protected by the First Amend-
ment even if they knew or had reason to know that the tape was illegally re-
corded. Although the Bartnicki majority tried to minimize the extent of its
disagreement with the D.C. Circuit by focusing on the media defendants,
who had no analogue in the Boehner case,235 the Bartnicki majority still held
that the conduit of the information was protected every bit as much as the
ultimate publishers. In so doing, the Bartnicki majority characterized Yo-
cum's conduct as pure speech, rejecting Boehner's conclusion that it was
more properly seen, at least partially, as conduct.
The first difficulty the Third Circuit had to overcome in reaching its con-
clusion was Cohen v. Cowles Media. In that case, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that "generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment
simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on
its ability to gather and report the news."236 Furthermore, "enforcement of
such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than
would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations."237
Despite holding that both Yocum and the media defendants engaged in
pure speech, rather than a mixture of conduct and speech, the majority ap-
230. See id. at 480-84 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at484-85.
232. See id. at 485.
233. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1999).
234. Id.
235. See 191 F.3d at 467 (noting that the ultimate publishers of the conversation were not de-
fendants in the Boehner case).
236. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,669 (1991).
237. Id. at 670.
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plied intermediate scrutiny because it found the Wiretap Act to be content-
neutral. Intermediate scrutiny requires the court to weigh the government's
interest, and the means selected to effectuate that interest, against counter-
vailing First Amendment freedoms. In doing this balancing, the court deter-
mined it must ask whether the regulation is "narrowly tailored" to achieve a
"significant governmental interest."238 The dissent agreed that this was the
right test, but rejected the majority's application of it to the facts.239
The government argued that the Act was narrowly tailored. The regula-
tion of third-party use, it said, eliminates the demand for the fruits of the
wrongdoer's labor.240 The Bartnicki majority was not persuaded, calling the
connection between the third-party provisions of the Wiretapping Act and
the prevention of the initial interception of communications "indirect at
best";241 in contrast, the dissent accepted the connection.242
The two sides thus differed on two issues: Whether handing over a tape
is pure "speech," and whether the prophylactic effect of a prohibition on
"disclosing" or "using" the contents of a communication would sufficiently
discourage the illicit acquisition of communications, thus justifying the
speech restriction at issue. Although there is something distasteful about
considering accurate information contraband, even if hedged with a scienter
requirement, it seems hard to believe that criminalizing the receipt and pub-
lishing of personal data would have no discernable effect on the incentive to
deploy privacy-destroying technologies. Rather, it seems likely that such a
law would reduce the incentive to gather data in the first place, since buyers
would be harder to find. The argument is weakest in a context such as Bart-
nicki, where the motives for disclosure are political rather than financial, and
the matter is of public interest. The argument is surely stronger when ap-
plied to the disclosure of personal profile data. However, even if one accepts
a connection between prohibiting the dissemination of information and dis-
couraging its collection, it does not necessarily follow that privacy interests
trump free speech rights. How the balance comes out will depend in part
upon what sort of scrutiny is applied; that in turn will depend upon how the
act of sharing the information is categorized.
A related issue raised by the Bartnicki/Boehner split is whether sharing
information is always speech protected by the First Amendment, or whether
there are occasions in which information is just a regulated commodity.
Questions concerning what is properly characterized as "speech" surround
238. SeeBarnicki, 200 F.2d at 124.
239. See Id. at 130.
240. Id. at 125. The government also argued that the Act would "deny] the wrongdoer the
fruits of his [own] labor," but the majority noted on the facts neither defendant was the "wrong-
doer"-the eavesdropper--so that justification did not apply. Id.
241. Id. at 126.
242. Id. at 133-34 (Pollak, J., dissenting).
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the regulation of everything digital, from the sale of bulk consumer data to
the regulation of software.243
In both Reno v. Condon and Los Angeles Police Department v. United
Reporting Publishing Corp,244 the Supreme Court treated government-owned
personal data as a commodity that could be subjected to reasonable regula-
tions on subsequent use.
Condon, however, is a decision about federalism. Neither side briefed
nor argued the First Amendment issues concerning reuse or republication
rights of data recipients, 245 so the issue remains open.246 It remains so even
though the Condon decision specifically relied upon and upheld the part of
the DPPA that regulates the resale and redisclosure of drivers' personal in-
formation by private individuals (who have obtained that information from a
state department of motor vehicles).247 The DPPA, the Court stated, "regu-
lates the States as the owners of databases." 248 It follows that similar rules
could be applied to any database owner; indeed the Condon Court defended
the DPPA against South Carolina's claim that it regulated states exclusively
by noting that § 2721(c) regulates everyone who comes into contact with the
data.249
In this light, the key factor in Condon may be the Court's decision that
no one has a right to drivers' license data in the first place because the data
belongs to the government. When examining cases involving the regulation
243. Cf Bernstein v. United States, 176 F.3d 1132, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn,
rehearing en bancgranted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) (deciding that source code is speech).
244. 120 S. Ct. 483,489 (1999).
245. Neither party briefed or argued the First Amendment issue, except that the United States'
reply brief responded to a claim, by an amicus, that Condon was analogous to the government tar-
geting a particular member of the press for adverse treatment. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at
17, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (No.98-1464), available in 1999 WL 792145.
246. As Eugene Volokh reminded me, "cases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument that
they never dealt with." Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994) (plurality opinion) (citing
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)); see also Miller v. Califor-
nia Pac. Med. Ctr., 991 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1993) ("It is a venerable principle that a court isn't
bound by a prior decision that failed to consider an argument or issue the later court finds persua-
sive.").
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c) (1999):
An authorized recipient of personal information ... may resell or redisclose the information
only for a use permitted under subsection (b) .... Any authorized recipient (except a recipient
under subsection (b)(11)) that resells or rediscloses personal information covered by this
chapter must keep for a period of5 years records identifying each person or entity that receives
information and the permitted purpose for which the information will be used and must make
such records available to the motor vehicle department upon request.
248. Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2000).
249. See id. (noting that the DPPA is generally applicable). In Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000,
1007 (7th Cir. 1998), Judge Easterbrook characterized First Amendment arguments against the
DPPA as "untenable." It is clear from the context, however, that Judge Easterbrook was speaking
only of the alleged First Amendment right to view driver's license records, and did not address the
republishing issue.
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of government data use and reuse, the Court adopts what amounts to an in-
formational right/privilege distinction: If access to the data is a privilege, it
can be regulated. The same logic appears in Los Angeles Police Department
v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.250 There, the Court upheld a statute
requiring persons requesting arrestee data to declare that the arrestees' ad-
dresses would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service.
The Court reasoned that because California had no duty to release arrestee
data at all, its decision to impose substantial conditions upon how the infor-
mation would be used could survive at least a facial First Amendment chal-
lenge.251
If the Court adopts what amounts to a right/privilege distinction relating
to government data, it is hard to see why the government's ability to impose
conditions upon the use of its proprietary data should be any less than that of
a private party, especially if those conditions arguably restrict speech. If data
are just commodities, then data usage can be regulated by contract or li-
cense-a view that may import elements of a property theory into what had
previously been the preserve of the First Amendment.
One view of the First Amendment, implied by Bartnicki, suggests that
the government cannot impose sweeping restrictions on data dissemination in
the name of privacy. The alternate view of the First Amendment, offered by
Boehner, is more likely to allow the government to impose public limits on
data dissemination and collection, and thus enhance privacy.252 The Boehner
vision, however, has potentially sweeping consequences unless some dis-
tinction can be delivered to prevent its application to publishers-which
seems particularly dubious now that everyone is a publisher. 53 If it does
apply publishers, then every newspaper that publishes a leak based upon
classified information is at risk, and political reporting would be thoroughly
chilled.4 Just as a newspaper does not lose its status as protected speech
because it is sold for a profit, other information, in other media, may be enti-
tled to full First Amendment protection however it is transferred or sold.
250. 120 S. Ct. 483,489 (1999).
251. See id.
252. Ironically, a vision that makes it possible to restrict the speech of persons who receive
contraband information in the name of privacy is also the most compatible with diverse enactment
such as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act and the Copyleft license, each of
which impose private conditions on data dissemination.
253. See generally Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805
(1995).
254. "[N]early every action, recommendation, or policy decision in the foreign policy or na-
tional security field is classified as a secret by someone at some time, often without valid reason,
except for bureaucratic convenience;' Floyd Abrams, Henry Mark Holzer, Don Oberdorfer & Rich-
ard K. Willard, The First Amendment and National Security, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 61, 75 (1988)
(remarks of Washington Post reporter Don Oberdorfer).
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b. The First Amendment and transactional data.
Transactional data-who bought what, when, where, and for how
much-might be considered ordinary speech, commercial speech, or just an
informational commodity. If transactional data is commercial speech, its
regulation would be reviewed under the test enunciated in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission ofNew York.
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive an-
swers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is nec-
essary to serve that interest. 255
Unlike public surveillance data, transactional data is usually collected in pri-
vate by one of the parties to the transaction.
The government's ability to regulate privately generated speech relating
to commerce is surprisingly underlitigated. This may be because there is not
(yet) much relevant regulation in United States law. Under the common law,
absent a special duty of confidentiality such as an attorney-client relation-
ship, the facts of a transaction belong jointly and severally to the participants.
If Alice buys a chattel from Bob, ordinarily both Alice and Bob are free to
disclose this fact. (If Alice is famous, however, Bob may not use her like-
ness to advertise his wares without her permission, although he certainly can
tell his friends that Alice was in his shop.256) Current doctrine suggests that
speech relating to commerce is ordinary speech, if one applies "'the 'com-
monsense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction,
which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and
other varieties of speech."57 On the other hand, the two most recent Su-
preme Court decisions relating to the regulation of personal data seem to im-
ply that some transactional data is just a commodity, although the special
255. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) (stating that it is an invasion of
privacy for someone to appropriate the name or likeness of another); see also CAL. CIV. CODE §
3344.1 (1999) (extending the right protect one's name or likeness from publicity for 70 years after
death). For a survey of the evolving right of publicity in the United States, compare Theodore F.
Haas, Storehouse of Starlight: The First Amendment Privilege to Use Names and Likenesses in
Commercial Advertising, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 539 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
begun a revolutionary reinterpretation of the constitutional status of commercial advertising, creat-
ing a tension between the right to control the use of one's name and likeness, and the free speech
rights of advertisers), with James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637 (1973) (arguing that only those who can show actual in-
jury from the appropriation of their name or likeness should be compensated; otherwise the First
Amendment should prevail).
257. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995) (citing Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,455-56 (1978))).
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circumstances of those decisions-the data was held by state or local gov-
ernments-make generalization hazardous.
A very small number of statutes impose limits upon the sharing of pri-
vate transactional data collected by persons not classed as professionals. The
most important may be the Fair Credit Reporting Act.258 In addition to im-
pressing rules designed to make credit reports more accurate, the statute also
contains rules prohibiting credit bureaus from making certain accurate state-
ments about aged peccadilloes, although this restriction does not apply to
reports requested for larger transactions.259 More directly federal privacy-
oriented commercial data statutes are rare. The Cable Communications Pol-
icy Act of 1984 forbids cable operators and third parties from monitoring the
viewing habits of subscribers. Cable operators must tell subscribers what
personal data is collected and, in general, must not disclose it to anyone
without the subscriber's consent.260 The "Bork Bill," formally known as the
Video Privacy Protection Act, also prohibits most releases of customers'
video rental data.261
Neither the privacy provisions of the Cable Act nor those of the Boric
Bill appear to have been challenged in court. Some have suggested that this
is evidence of their uncontroversial constitutionality.262 More likely, this
proves only that merchants in these two industries sell a great deal of sexu-
ally themed products and have no incentive to do anything to reduce their
customers' confidence that their viewing habits will not become public
knowledge. As a doctrinal matter, the statutes seem debatable. At least one
other restriction upon the use of legally acquired transactional data failed on
First Amendment grounds: When the state of Maine sought to require con-
sumer consent before a firm could request a credit history, credit reporting
258. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681s (1999).
259. See id. § 1681c (prohibiting reporting of bankruptcies that are more than 10 years old;
"[c]ivil suits, civil judgments, and records of arrest that, from date of entry, antedate the report by
more than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever is the
longer period;" tax liens paid seven or more years earlier, or other noncriminal adverse information
that is more than seven years old. None of the prohibitions apply if the transaction for which the
report will be used exceeds $150,000, or the job offer pays more than $75,000 per year.); see also
id. § 1681k (requiring that consumer credit reporting agencies have procedures in place to verify the
accuracy of public records containing information adverse to the data subject).
260. See 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1999).
261. 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1999)). The act allows videotape
rental providers to release customer names and addresses to third parties so long as there is no dis-
closure of titles purchased or rented. Customers can, however, be grouped into categories accord-
ing to the type of film they rent. See id. § 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii).
262. See Kang, supra note 16, at 1282 (arguing that the proposed Cyberspace Privacy Act
survives First Amendment scrutiny because of its similarity to the Cable Act and the Video Privacy
Protection Act, neither of which have been successfully challenged on First Amendment grounds).
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agency Equifax won a judgment from the state supreme court holding that
this was an unconstitutional restriction on its First Amendment right.263
3. Fear.
The most important constraint on an effective response to privacy-
destroying technologies is fear. While greed for marketing data drives some
applications, fear seems far more central, and much harder to overcome.
Employers monitor employees because they are afraid workers may be doing
unproductive or even illegal things. Communities appreciate cameras in
public places because, whether cameras reduce or merely displace crime, one
seems to be safer in front of the lens. Law enforcement officials constantly
seek new tools to compete in what they see as an arms race with terrorists,
drug dealers, and other criminals.264
It would be well beyond the scope of this article to attempt to determine
which of these fears are well founded, but any political attempt to restrict
personal data collection will have to confront these fears, whether they are
well founded or not.
In arguing for increased privacy protection, one subtle fear also needs to
be considered: Anything that increases a citizen's reasonable expectation of
privacy will, under current doctrine, also increase the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections.265 Law enforcement officials are generally not re-
quired to obtain warrants in order to examine things that people have no rea-
sonable expectation of keeping private; expanding the reasonableness of
privacy expectations would mean that law enforcement officials would have
to secure warrants before aiming new technologies at homes or bodies. The
answer to the subtle fear may be a counter-fear: The more commonplace that
ubiquitous surveillance becomes, the less the Fourth Amendment will be able
to protect the average citizen.
B. Making Privacy Rules Within the Constraints
The result of these constraints on an effective response to privacy-
destroying technologies is evident from the relatively limited protection
against data acquisition provided by existing privacy rules in the United
263. See generally Equifax Serv., Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980) (characterizing
Equifax's interest as commercial speech, but nonetheless finding that the First Amendment was
violated).
264. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip,
and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 850-60 (1995) (discussing fear in the context of con-
stitutional archetypes) <http:ll-wvw.law.miami.edul-froomkinlarticlesclipper.htm>.
265. See Morton, supra note 198, at 1470 (noting that current Fourth Amendment law is set-
tled in regard to an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy).
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States. The constraints also suggest that several proposals for improving pri-
vacy protections are likely to be less effective than proponents might hope.
1. Nonlegal proposals.
Proposals for nonlegal solutions to the problem of privacy-destroying
technologies must focus either on the data collector or on the data subject.
Proposals focusing on the data collector usually invoke some version of en-
lightened self-regulation. Proposals focusing on the data subject usually in-
voke the rhetoric of privacy-enhancing technologies or other forms of self-
help.
Self-regulation has proved to be a chimera. In contrast, privacy-
enhancing technologies clearly have a role to play in combating privacy-
destroying technologies, particularly in areas such as protecting the privacy
of telecommunications and other electronic messaging systems. It is un-
likely, however, that privacy-enhancing technologies alone will be sufficient
to meet the multifaceted challenge described in Part I above. There may be
some opportunities for the law to encourage privacy-enhancing technologies
through subsidies or other legal means, but frequently the most important
role for the law will be to remove existing obstacles to the employment of
privacy-enhancing technologies or to ensure new ones do not arise.
a. "Self-regulation."
United States privacy policy has, until recently, been dominated by a fo-
cus on a very limited number of issues and, within those issues, a commit-
ment to ask industry to self-regulate.266 Since the economic incentive to
provide strong privacy protections is either weak, nonexistent, or at least
nonuniformly distributed among all participants in the marketplace, most
serious proposals for self-regulation among market participants rely on the
threat of government regulation if the data collectors fail to regulate them-
selves sufficiently.267
Without some sort of government intervention to encourage self-
regulation, "[w]olves self-regulate for the good of themselves and the pack,
266. See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Frantework for Global Electronic Coln-
merce § 2 (1997) (the "E-Commerce White Paper") <http:llwww.iitf.nistgov/eleccomnfecommhtm>
267. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 789 (1999) ("During the debate over self-regulation, U.S. industry took
privacy more seriously only when government threats of regulation were perceived as credible.");
see also Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement ii the Protection
of Personal Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 3, 11
(U.S. Dep't of Commerce ed., 1997) (arguing that industry members might rationally prefer an
unregulated market in which they can sell personal information to a self-regulated market, and
therefore only the threat of mandatory government regulation can induce them to self-regulate).
[Vol. 52:14611524
May 2000] THE DEATH OFPRIVACY? 1525
not the deer."268 Perhaps the most visible and successful self-regulatory ini-
tiative has been TRUSTe.com, a private third-party privacy-assurance sys-
tem. TRUSTe.com provides a privacy "trustmark" to about 750 online
merchants who pay up to $6900 per year to license it.269 In exchange for the
fee, TRUSTe verifies the existence of the online merchant's privacy policy,
but does not conduct an audit. TRUSTe does, however, investigate com-
plaints alleging that firms have violated their privacy policies. It currently
receives about 375 complaints per year, and finds about twenty percent to be
valid, triggering additional investigation. These decisions do not appear to
be published save in exceptional circumstances.270
The meaningfulness of the "trustmark" recently was called into question
by the actions of a trustmark holder. TRUSTe confirmed that thirteen mil-
lion copies of trustmark holder RealNetworks' RealJukebox Software had
created "globally unique identifiers" ("GUIDs") and transmitted them to
RealNetworks via the Internet every time the software was in use. The
GUID could be associated with the user's registration information to create a
profile of their listening habits.271 RealNetworks' privacy policy disclosed
none of these facts. Nevertheless, once they came to light, RealNetworks
kept its "trustmark" because the data collection was a result of downloaded
software, and not anything on RealNetworks' web page. Both the com-
pany's web privacy policy and its accompanying "trustmark" applied only to
data collection via its web pages rather than Internet-related privacy intru-
sions.272 A similar distinction between data collected via a web page and
data collected by user-run software allowed Microsoft to keep its "trustmark"
after the discovery that its registration software sent a GUID and accompa-
nying user data during Windows 98 registration, even when the user told it
268. Roger Clarke, The Legal Context of Privacy-Enhancing and Privacy-Sympathetic Tech-
nologies, Apr. 12, 1999 <http://www.anu.edtuau/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/lFlorham.html>.
269. See <http://wwvw.truste.com/userslusers-lookup.htinl> (describing TRUSTe's services).
270. See id. at Investigation Results <http:llwww.truste.orgfuserslusersinvestigations.html>
(stating that TRUSTe posts results of its investigations "[flrom time to time"). The page currently
lists the results of only six investigations (as of April 2000).
271. See RealNetworks' Privacy Intrusion, JUNKBUSTERS <http://vww.junkbusters.comht/
en/real.html> (detailing the controversies surrounding the GUID discovery); TRUSTe, Truste &
RealNetworks Collaborate to Close Privacy Gap <http:l/www.truste.org/abouttabout_
software.html> (describing TRUSTe's efforts to resolve the GUID situation); RealJukebox Update,
REALNErWORKS <http://wv.realnetworks.comcompary/privacy/jukeboxlprivayupdate.html>
(announcing RealNetwork's release of a software update designed to address customer concerns
about privacy); Robert Lemos, Can You Trust TRUSTe?, ZDNBr NEWs, Nov. 2, 1999 <http://
www.zdnet.comfzdnnlstorieslnewsl0,4586,2387000,00.htnl> (claiming that TRUSTe does not take
active measures to assure that its license holders do not violate consumer privacy).
272. See TRUSTe & RealNetworks Collaborate, supra note 271 (explaining that the GUID in-
cident was outside the scope of TRUSTe's privacy seal program because it did not involve collec-
tion of data on RealNetworks' website); see also TRUSTe FAQ <http:/www.truste.orgIusers/
users investigationfaqs.html> (stating that TRUSTe does not deal with software or offline privacy
practices but only with information collected and used by web sites).
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not to.273 TRUSTe announced, however, that it was developing a pilot soft-
ware privacy program with RealNetworks. Although the announcement did
not actually say that the program would be expanded to other companies,
much less when, it implied that it would.274
The RealNetworks incident followed an earlier, similar fiasco in which
the FTC settled a complaint against GeoCities. 275 The FTC charged that
GeoCities "misrepresented the purposes for which it was collecting personal
identifying information from children and adults." 276 According to the FTC,
GeoCities promised customers that their registration -information would be
used only to "provide members the specific advertising offers and products
or services they requested and that the 'optional' information [education
level, income, marital status, occupation, and interests] would not be released
to anyone without the member's permission."277 In fact, however, GeoCities
created a database that included "email and postal addresses, member interest
areas, and demographics including income, education, gender, marital status,
and occupation" and disclosed customer data to marketers.278 In settling the
case, GeoCities issued a press release denying the allegations. GeoCities
then changed its privacy policy to state that user data might be disclosed to
third parties with user consent (the previous policy also implied this; in any
event the FTC charge was that disclosures occurred without consent).
TRUSTe, which had issued a trustmark to GeoCities during the FTC investi-
gation, did not remove it.279
Critics suggest that TRUSTe's unwillingness to remove or suspend a
trustmark results from its funding structure. Firms license the trustmark; in
addition, some corporate sponsors, including Microsoft but neither RealNet-
works nor GeoCities, contribute up to $100,000 per year in support. 280 If
TRUSTe were to start suspending trustmarks, it would lose revenue; if it
273. See Watchdog #1723-Microsoft Statement ofFinding, TRUSTe <http://www.truste.org/
users/users_w1723.html> (announcing that Microsoft had not violated its TRUSTe license because
the manner in which the information was transferred did not fall within the boundaries of the
TRUSTe license agreement, but acknowledging that the data transfer did compromise consumer
trust and privacy).
274. See TRUSTe &RealNetworks Collaborate, supra note 271 (announcing TRUSTe's plan
to extend its privacy services to RealNetworks' software applications and to form a working group
of software and Internet experts to advise TRUSTe how to extend its privacy seal program).
275. See Jamie McCarthy, TRUSTe Decides Its Own Fate Today, SLASH DOT, Nov. 8, 1999
<http://slashdot.orglyro/99/11l05/1021214.shtml> (detailing several other debacles, in which trust-
mark holders violated privacy policies or principles but kept their accreditation).
276. Janet Kornblum, FTC, GeoCities Settle on Privacy, CNET NFWS, Aug. 13, 1998 (quot-
ing on FTC statement) <http:llnews.cnetcomlnewsl0-1005-200-332199.html>.
277. Id (quoting GeoCities' membership sign-up form).
278. Id. (quoting FTC statement).
279. See Jamie McCarthy, Is TRUSTe Trustworthy?, THE ETHICAL SPECTACLE, Sept. 1998
<http:/www.spectacle.org1998/mccarthy.html> (detailing the denial).
280. See TRUSTe, TRUSTe Sponsors <http./lvrv.truste.orgtabout/aboutsponsors.htm>
(listing TRUSTe's corporate sponsors).
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were to get a reputation for being too aggressive toward clients, they might
decide they are better off without a trustmark and the attendant hassle. In the
absence of a meaningful way for consumers to evaluate the meaning of a
trustmark or competing certifications, 281 TRUSTe certainly has no economic
incentive to be tough on its funding sources.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the TRUSTe story is that
TRUSTe's defense of its actions has a great deal of merit: The expectations
loaded upon it, and perhaps the publicity surrounding it, vastly exceed its
modest self-imposed mission of verifying members' web-site privacy asser-
tions, and bringing members into compliance with their own often quite lim-
ited promises.282 Taken on its own terms, TRUSTe is a very modest first
initiative in self-regulation. That said, TRUSTe's nonprofit status, the spon-
sorship of public interest groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
and the enlightened self-interest of participant corporations who may wish to
avoid government regulation all provide reasons why privacy certification
bodies might someday grow teeth.
A more generic problem with self-regulatory schemes, even those lim-
ited to e-commerce or web sites in general, is that they regulate only those
motivated or principled enough to take part in them. It may be that competi-
tive pressures might ultimately drive firms to sdek privacy certification, but
currently fewer than 1000 firms participate in either TRUSTe's or BBBOn-
line's programs, which suggests that market pressure to participate is weak to
nonexistent. Indeed, after several years of calling for self-regulation regard-
ing the collection of data from children, the Federal Trade Commission fi-
nally decided to issue extensive regulations controlling online merchants
seeking to collect personal information from minors.283 Even if, as seems to
be the case, industry self-regulation is at best marginally effective without
legal intervention, and current third-party trust certification bodies have only
a very limited influence, it still does not mean that the FTC's response is the
only way to proceed.
The United States may be unique in endorsing self-regulation without le-
gal sanctions to incentivize or enforce it;284 it is hard to believe that the strat-
egy is anything more than a political device to avoid regulation. It does not
follow, however, that self-regulation is a bad idea, so long as legal conditions
281. See McCarthy, supra note 275 (noting that TRUSTe is by far the industry leader in the
United States. Its only competitor, BBBOnline, has fewer than 100 members, compared to
TRUSTe's 750.).
282. See, e.g., note 273 supra.
283. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (effective April 21,
2000) (requiring parental consent prior to collection of information from children under 13).
284. See ROGER CLARKE, SENATE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMMITTEE




create incentives for parties to engage in it seriously. For example, an enor-
mous amount of energy has gone into crafting "fair information practices." 285
One way of creating incentives for accurate, if not necessarily ideal, pri-
vacy policies would be to use legislation, market forces, and the litigiousness
of Americans to create a self-policing (as opposed to self-regulating) system
for web-based data collection. If all sites that collect personal data were re-
quired to disclose what they collect and what they do with it, if it were an
actionable offense to violate a posted privacy policy, and if that private right
of action were to carry statutory damages, then users-or class-action coun-
sel-would have an effective incentive to police privacy policies. Indeed,
the surreptitious harvesting of music preference data by RealJukeBox moti-
vated two sets of enterprising lawyers to file class action lawsuits.286 One
federal class action suit alleged misrepresentation and violation of the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act.287 Another class action was filed in California
state court under the state's unfair business practices law. Both lawsuits,
however, face a problem in valuing the damages. In the federal case, the
plaintiffs seek a refund of the thirty dollars that some users paid for the reg-
istered version of the software. In the California case, plaintiffs plan to base
damages upon their estimate of the market value of data that RealJukebox
collected; they will pick a figure after discovery.288 Unfortunately for the
plaintiffs, there is no reason to believe that even a great deal of music prefer-
ence data is worth anything near the five hundred dollars per head that their
lawyers estimated for the press. The willingness of the federal plaintiffs to
sue for only thirty dollars per head suggests that creating a statutory damages
remedy, even with only small damages, might create a sufficient incentive to
police online privacy policies.
The web, however, is not the only source of concern; other means will be
required to address different technologies.
b. PETs and other self-help.
Privacy Enhancing Technologies ("PETs") have been defined as "techni-
cal devices organizationally embedded in order to protect personal identity
by minimizing or eliminating the collection of data that would identify an
285. See, e.g., OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER
FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA <http://www.oecd.org/dstilsti/it/secur/prid/PRIV-EN.HTM>; Roger
Clarke, Internet Privacy Concerns Confirm the Case for Intervention <http://%ww.anu.edu.aul
people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM99.html>.
286. See Brian McWilliams, Real Hit With Another Privacy Lawsut. INTERNErNEWS.COM,
Nov. 10, 1999 <http:llwww.intemetnews.com/streaming-newsfarticle/0,1087,8161_236261,00.html>.
287. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1999).
288. See McWilliams, supra note 286.
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individual or, if so desired, a legal person." 289 In addition to PETs embedded
in organizations, there are also a number of closely related technologies that
people can use for self-help, especially when confronted by organizations
that are not privacy-friendly. Such devices can be hardware, such as masks
or thick curtains, or software, such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences
("P3P"), which seeks to reduce the transaction cost of determining how
much personal data should be surrendered in a given transaction.
PETs and other privacy protection technologies can be integrated in a
system design, or they can be a reaction to it. Law can encourage the de-
ployment of PETs, but it can also discourage them, sometimes unintention-
ally. Some have suggested that the law should require, or at least encourage,
the development of PETs. "Government must ... act in a fashion that as-
sures technological development in a direction favoring privacy protections
rather than privacy intrusions."290 It is a worthy goal and should be part of a
comprehensive response to privacy-destroying technologies.
Sometimes overlooked, however, are the ways in which existing law can
impose obstacles to PETs. Laws and regulations designed to discourage the
spread of cryptography are only the most obvious examples of impediments
to privacy-enhancing technology. Legal obstacles to privacy self-help also
extend to the lowest technologies, such as antimask laws. In some cases, all
PETs may need to flourish is the removal of legal barriers.
Privacy can be engineered into systems design, 291 systems can be built
without much thought about privacy, or they can be constructed in ways in-
tentionally designed to destroy it, in order to capture consumer information
or create audit trails for security purposes. In each case, after the system is in
operation, users may be able to deploy self-help PETs to increase their pri-
vacy.
System designers frequently have great flexibility to include privacy
protections if they so choose. For example, when designing a road-pricing
system, transponders can be connected to a card that records a toll balance
and deducts funds as needed. No data identifying the driver or the car is
needed, just whether there are sufficient funds. Or, the transponder can in-
stead emit a unique ID code, keyed to a record, that identifies the driver and
289. Herbert Burkert, Privacy Enhancing Technologies and Trust in the Information Society
(1997) <http:llwww.gmd.delPeoplelHerbert.BurkertStresa.html>.
290. Reidenberg, supra note 267, at 789; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The
Formulation of Ifonnation Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. R.V. 553, 584 (1998)
(advocating that companies that do not protect personal data through PETs should be subject to
legal liability).
291. For some suggested basic design principles, see INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COM-
MISSIONER/ONTARIO, CANADA & REGISTRATIEKAMER, supra note 180; see also Ian Goldberg,
David Wagner & Eric Brewer, Privacy-enhancing Technologies for the Internet <http://www.cs.
berkeley.edu/.-daw/papersprivacy-compcon97-ww/privacy-htmi.html> (describing existing PETs
and calling for additional ones).
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either checks for sufficient funds or bills her. The first system protects pri-
vacy but requires an alternate way to charge drivers whose cards are de-
pleted. The second system requires billing and can create a huge database of
vehicular movements.292
In general, designers can organize the system to withhold (or never
gather) data about the person, the object of the transaction, the action per-
formed, or even the system itself.293 Most electronic road-pricing schemes
currently deployed identify the vehicle or an attached token.
If privacy has been built into a system, the need for individual self-help
may be small, although in this world where software and other high technol-
ogy is notoriously imperfect, users may have reasons for caution. If PETs
are not built into the system, or the user lacks confidence in its implementa-
tion, she may engage in self-help. The sort of technology that is likely to be
effective depends upon the circumstances and the nature of the threats to pri-
vacy. If, for example, a person fears hidden cameras, then a pocket camera
detector is just the thing.294
For matters involving electronic communications or data storage, en-
cryption is the major PET.295 Here, however, the United States government
has engaged in a long-running effort to retard the spread of consumer cryp-
tography that might be used to protect emails, faxes, stored data, and tele-
phone conversations from eavesdroppers and intruders-ostensibly because
these same technologies also enable the targets of investigations to shield
their communications from investigators.296 As a panel of the Ninth Circuit
concluded in an opinion subsequently withdrawn for en banc consideration:
The availability and use of secure encryption may offer an opportunity to re-
claim some portion of the privacy we have lost. Government efforts to control
encryption thus may well implicate not only the First Amendment rights of
cryptographers intent on pushing the boundaries of their science, but also the
constitutional rights of each of us as potential recipients of encryption's bounty.
Viewed from this perspective, the government's efforts to retard progress in
cryptography may implicate the Fourth Amendment, as well as the right to
292. For a discussion of such systems, see generally Santa Clara Symposium on Privacy and
I"VHS, supra note 65.
293. See Herbert Burkert, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY, supra note 178, at 125, 125-28.
294. See Carl Kozlowski, Chicago Security-Device Shop Gets Caught in Privacy Debate,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1999, available in 1999 WL 28717597 (describing $400 to $1600 pocket-sized
detectors that vibrate when recording devices are near).
295. For a discussion of encryption, see generally Froomkin, supra note 264.
296. See generally id.; A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over
Cryptographic Key "Escrow," 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15 (1996); Norman Andrew Crain, Com-
mentary, Bernstein, Kam, and Junger: Constitutional Challenges to Cryptographic Regulations, 50
ALA. L. REV. 869 (1999).
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speak anonymously, the right against compelled speech, and the right to infor-
mational privacy.
297
Perhaps in fear of another adverse judgment from the Ninth Circuit, the
government recently issued substantially liberalized encryption rules that for
the first time allow the unrestricted export of cryptographic source code.298
In a striking demonstration of the effects of a removal of government restric-
tions on PETs, the new rules emboldened Microsoft, the leading manufac-
turer of consumer PC operating systems, to pledge to include strong 128-bit
encryption in the next release of its software.299
The United States' cryptography policy was an intentional effort to block
the spread of a technology for reasons of national security or law enforce-
ment convenience. Cryptography is a particularly significant PET because,
if properly implemented, the mathematical advantage lies with the defender.
Each increase in key length and security imposes a relatively small burden
upon the party securing the data, but an exponential computational burden
upon any would-be eavesdropper. Unlike so many other technologies,
cryptography is relatively inexpensive and accessible to anyone with a com-
puter or a dedicated encryption device. Cryptography is no privacy panacea,
however. It is difficult to implement properly, vulnerable to every security
weakness in underlying operating systems and software programs, and even
at its best, it addresses only communications and records privacy-which, as
Part I above demonstrates, is a significant fraction, but only a fraction, of the
ways in which technology allows observers to collect information about us.
In other cases, legal obstacles to PETs are either by-products of other
policies, or the result of long-standing prohibitions which had consequences
in the networked era. For example, the prohibition against "reverse engi-
neering" software-decompiling something to find out what makes it tick-
may or may not be economically efficient.300 But, it makes it nearly impos-
sible for technically sophisticated users to satisfy themselves that programs
are cryptographically secure, thus making it nearly impossible for them to
297. Bernstein v. United States, 176 F.3d 1132, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted),
opinion withdrawn, reh 'g en bane granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
298. See Revisions to Encryption Items, 65 Fed. Reg. 2491 (2000) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
pts. 734,740, 742, 770, 772 & 774); see also Letter from the Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Export
Admin., to Cindy A. Cohn, attorney, McGlashnand Sarrail (Feb. 17, 2000) <http://www.cryptome.
orglbxa-bernstein.htm> (explaining that source code is not considered "publicly available" and thus
remains subject to post-export reporting requirements).
299. See Reuters, Strong Encryption for Win 2000 <http'/www.wired.com/news/technology/
0,1282,33745,00.htlI>.
300. See David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Re-
flections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, and "Aggressive Neutrality,"
13 BERKELEYTECH. L.1 1173, 1214-24 (1998); cf Celine M. Guillou, The Reverse Engineering of
Computer Software in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Approach, 22 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 533 (1998) (contrasting rules generally allowing reverse engineering of software in the
European Union with more restrictive rules in the United States).
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reassure the rest of us, unless the program's authors release the source code
for review.
Rules banning low-technology privacy tools may also need reexamina-
tion in light of the reduced privacy in public places. One possible reaction to
ubiquitous cameras in public places would be widespread wearing of masks
as fashion accessories. Many states, however, have antimask laws on the
books, usually enacted as a means of controlling the Ku Klux Klan; some of
these statutes are more than one hundred years old.301 The statutes make it a
crime to appear in public in a mask.302 Judicial opinion appears divided over
whether prohibitions against appearing masked in public violate the First
Amendment.303 Regardless of the constitutional issues, it is undeniable that
existing antimask laws were enacted before anyone imagined that all urban
public spaces might be subject to round-the-clock surveillance. Masks,
which were once identified with KKK intimidation, could take on a new and
potentially more benign social purpose and connotation; if so, the merits of
antimask laws-if they are even constitutional under the right to anonymous
301. See, e.g., Walpolev. State, 68 Tenn. 370,372-73 (1878).
302. See Wayne R. Allen, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the First
Amendmnent, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 821 n.17 (1991) (citing statutes from 10 states); Oskar E. Rey,
Antintask Laws. Exploring the Outer Bounds of Protected Speech Under the First Amendment-
State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (1991).
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 241 makes it a felony for two or more persons to travel in disguise on
public highways or enter the premises of another with the intent to prevent the free exercise and
enjoyment of any legal right or privilege by another citizen. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1999).
303. Decisions holding antimask laws unconstitutional include: American Knights of Ku
Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that a city ordi-
nance prohibiting mask-wearing for the purpose of concealing identity in public violated First
Amendment rights to freedom of expression and anonymity); Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 91
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (granting temporary restraining order preventing enforcement of antimask law
against Iranian students demonstrating against the Shah); Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 813, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a statute prohibiting wearing masks in public was
overbroad and finding the state's fear that violence would result from the mere presence of anony-
mous persons is "unfounded").
Cases upholding antimask laws include: Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. Safir, No. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 28106 (2d Cir. Oct. 22, 1999) (staying order of injunction
against an 1845 New York state law forbidding masks at public demonstrations); Ryan v. County of
DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding a rule prohibiting masks in the courthouse
against a First Amendment challenge on grounds that the rule was reasonable because "[t]he wear-
ing of a mask inside a courthouse implies intimidation"); Hernandez v. Superintendent,
Fredericksburg-Rappahannock Joint Security Center, 800 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 n.14 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(noting that a statute might have been held unconstitutional if petitioner had demonstrated that un-
masking himself would have restricted his ability to enjoy free speech and freedom of association);
Schumam v. State, 270 F. Supp. 730, 731-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (denying temporary injunction of
enforcement of a statute requiring licensing of assemblage of masked persons); State v. Miller, 398
S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990) (rejecting challenge to antimask statute); State v. Gates, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359
(Ariz. 1978) (rejecting a challenge to an antimask provision in an indecent exposure statute); Wal-
pole, 68 Tenn. at 372-73 (enforcing statute); Hemandez v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 398, 401
(Va. Ct. App. 1991). Compare Allen, supra note 302, at 829-30 (arguing for the validity and reten-
tion of antimask laws), with Rey, supra note 302, at 1145-46 (arguing that antimask laws are un-
constitutional).
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speech enunciated in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission3O4-will need
rethinking.
2. Using law to change the defaults.
As the dimensions of the technological threat to privacy assumptions
gradually have become clearer, academics, privacy commissioners, and tech-
nologists have advanced a number of suggestions for legal reforms designed
to shift the law's default rule away from formal neutrality regarding data
collection. Rather than having transactional data belong jointly and severally
to both parties, some proposals would create a traditional property or an in-
tellectual property interest in personal data, which could not be taken by
merchants or observers without bargaining. Others propose new privacy
torts and crimes, or updating of old ones, to make various kinds of data col-
lection in public or private spaces tortious or even criminal.
While some of these proposals have evident merit, they also have draw-
backs.
a. Transactional data-oriented solutions.
Scholars and others have proposed a number of legal reforms, usually
based upon either traditional property or intellectual property law, to increase
the protection available to personal data by vesting the sole initial right to use
it in the data subject. Although current proposals are the product of great
ingenuity and thus vary considerably, the common element is a desire to
change the default rules in the absence of agreement. Changing the default
rule to create a property interest in personal data, even when shared with a
merchant, or visible in public, has a number of attractive properties.305 It
also has significant problems, however, both theoretically and practically.
One problem is that any such rule has to be crafted with care to avoid
trampling the entire First Amendment. Any rule that makes it an offense to
express what one sees or knows (such as who shops in one's store or who
slept with whom) strikes dangerously close to core values of free speech.306
Current doctrine leaves open a space for limited regulation of transactional
304. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
305. For a micro-economic argument that this change would be efficient given existing mar-
ket imperfections, see Kenneth C. Laudon, Extensions to the Theory of Markets and Privacy: Me-
chanics of Pricing Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE,
supra note 275, at4l.
306. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Finding (More) Privacy Protection in Intellectual
Property Lore, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REv. VS 8 <http:llstlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Symposia/Privacy/
index.htm>; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Infonnation as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of.Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992) (worrying
that this is a bad thing).
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data along the lines of the Cable Television Act and the Boric Bill.307 That
does not mean such rules are wise or easy to draft. As Professor Kang re-
minds us: "Consider what would happen if Bill Clinton had sovereign con-
trol over every bit of personal information about him. Then the New York
Times could not write an editorial using information about Bill Clinton with-
out his approval."308 No one seriously suggests giving anyone that much
control over their personal data, and certainly not to public figures. Rather,
property- or intellectual-property-based proposals usually concentrate on
transactional data.
From a privacy perspective, the attraction of shifting the default rule is
evident. Currently, user ignorance of the privacy consequences of disclo-
sure, the extent of data collection, and the average value of a datum, com-
bined with the relatively high transaction costs of negotiating privacy
provisions in consumer transactions governed by standard form clauses,
causes privacy issues to drop off the radar in much of routine economic life.
Firms interested in capturing and reselling user data have almost no incentive
to change this state of affairs.309 Shifting the default rule to require a data
collector to make some sort of agreement with her subject before having a
right to reuse her data gives the subject the benefit of notice and of transac-
tion costs.
The transaction cost element is particularly significant, but also poten-
tially misleading. Shifting the default rule means that so long as the transac-
tion costs of making an agreement are high, the right to personal data will not
transfer and privacy will be protected. It is a mistake, however, to think that
transaction costs are symmetrical. The very structural features of market
exchange that make it costly for individuals to negotiate exceptional privacy
clauses in today's market make it inexpensive for the author of the standard
form clause to word it in order to include a conveyance of the data and a
consent to its use.310
Whether it is worth the trouble, or even economically efficient, to craft a
system that results in people selling their data for a frequent flyer mile or two
depends primarily upon whether people are able to value the consequences of
disclosure properly and whether contract rules can be changed to prevent the
tyranny of the standard form. If not, then the standard form will continue to
307. See text accompanying notes 260-262 supra.
308. Kang, supra note 16, at 1293 n.332.
309. See, e.g., Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1686 (1999) (noting "the lack of incentives to make the majority of firms oppose their self-
interest, which lies in maintaining the status quo").
310. Cf. Philip E. Agre, Introduction, in TECHNOLOGY & PRiVACY, supra note 178, at 1, 11
(noting an information asymmetry between firms and consumers: firms control the releases of
information about themselves and about what information they have on consumers).
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dominate much of the solution, to the detriment of data privacy; privacy
myopia will do the rest.
Ironically, the advances in technology that are reducing the transactions
costs of particularized contracting also work to facilitate the sale of personal
data, potentially lowering the cost enough to make the purchase worthwhile.
If transaction costs really are dropping, it may be more important to craft
rules that require separate contracts for data exchange and prevent the data
sale from becoming part of a standard form. Such a rule would require not
only an option to "opt-in" or "opt-out" as an explicit step in a transaction, if
not a wholly separate one, but also would require that failure to convey rights
to personal data have no repercussions. But even that may not suffice. Here,
the European experience is especially instructive. Despite state-of-the-art
data privacy law, people,
routinely and unknowingly contracted away their right to informational self-
determination as part and parcel of a business deal, in which the right itself was
not even a 'bargaining chip' during negotiations. But, since consent of the data
subject had to be sufficient ground to permit information processing if one takes
seriously the right to self-determination, such contractual devaluations of data
protection were legally valid, and the individual's right to data protection sud-
denly tarned into a toothless paper tiger.311
In short, even when faced with European data protection law, the standard
form triumphed.
Given that property-law-based solutions are undermined in the market-
place, some European nations have gone further and removed a consumer's
freedom to contract away her right to certain classes of data, such as infor-
mation about race, religion, and political opinions.312 While likely to be an
effective privacy-enhancing solution, this is neither one that corrects market
failure in order to let the market reach an efficient outcome, nor one that re-
lies on property rights; it thus eliminates the most common justifications for
property-law-based proposals to data privacy.313
b. Tort law and other approaches to public data collection.
Tort- and criminal-law-based proposals to enhance data privacy tend to
differentiate between data collected in places where one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, such as one's home, and public places where the law
usually presumes no such expectation. Some of the more intriguing propos-
als further differentiate by the means used to collect information, with sense-
311. Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Generational Development ofData Protection in Europe, in
TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY, supra note 178, at 219,232.
312. See id. at 233.
313. Cf Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense
of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2410-16 (1996); Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, U.S. Government
Information Policy 16 <http:llwww.sins.berkeley.edul-hallPaperslpolicy/policy.html>.
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enhanced collections, especially new ones, being subject to increased regula-
tion.
For example, there are proposals to expand the tort of unreasonable in-
trusion to include peering into private spaces. Where previously the tort of-
ten required the tortfeasor's presence in the private space,314 the proposal
allows the presence requirement to be fulfilled virtually.315 A rejuvenated
tort of unreasonable intrusion might adapt well to sense-enhanced scanning
of the body or the home. It is unlikely to cope as well with data generated in
commercial transactions, for the same reasons noted above: transactional
data are (at least formally) disclosed with consent. Similarly, privacy torts
are unlikely to have much impact on DNA or medical databases since the
data are either extracted with consent, or in circumstances, such as arrests,
where consent is not an issue.
There is also reason to doubt whether privacy torts can be extended to
cover CCTV and other forms of public tracking. Traditionally, privacy torts
do not protect things in public view on the theory that such things are, by
definition, not private.316 Expanding them to cover public places would con-
flict directly with the First Amendment.
Some states have chosen to promote specialized types of privacy through
targeted statutes. California's antipaparazzi statute may be a model.317 It
314. The tort currently requires an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in place or
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965). Some jurisdictions also
require an actual trespass by the defendant. See, e.g., Pierson v. News Group Publications, Inc., 549
F. Supp. 635, 640 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
315. "The time has come," argues Professor McClurg, "for courts to recognize openly and
forthrightly the existence of the concept of 'public privacy' and to afford protection of that right by
allowing recovery for intrusions that occur in or from places accessible to the public." McClurg,
supra note 195, at 1054-59 (proposing to revive the tort of invasion of privacy in public places
through application of a multipart test); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requienfor a Heavyveight:
A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 347-48, 358-62
(1983).
316. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that taking
aerial photographs is not a Fourth Amendment search); Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc, 955 P.2d
469, 490 (Cal. 1998) (distinguishing between an accident scene, in public view, and medivac heli-
copter, where there was a reasonable expectation of privacy); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OFTORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
317. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1708.8(h) (West 1999):
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts to capture,
in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording,
or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under
circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use
of a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if
this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved with-
out a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device was used.
Id § 1708.8(k):
For the purposes of this section, "personal and familial activity" includes, but is not limited to,
intimate details of the plaintiff's personal life, interactions with the plaintiff's family or signifi-
cant others, or other aspects of plaintiff's private affairs or concerns. Personal and familial ac-
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carefully focuses on creating liability for the gathering of information by pri-
vate persons using sense-enhancing tools. While expanding the zone of pri-
vacy in the home, treating" one's property line like a wall impermeable to
data, the statute does not cover activities on public streets and purposely
avoids other First Amendment obstacles.
While the California statute focuses on creating narrow zones of privacy,
an alternate approach seeks to regulate access to tools that can undermine
privacy. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2512 prohibits the manufacture, distribu-
tion, possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepting devices.318 Perhaps it is time to call for regulation of "snooper's
tools," akin to the common law and statutory regulation of "burglar's
tools?"319
Both of these approaches have potential, although both also have practi-
cal limitations in addition to substantial First Amendment constraints. Many
privacy-destroying tools have legitimate uses. For example, television cam-
eras, even surveillance cameras, have their place, in banks, for example.
Thus blanket rules prohibiting access to the technology are unlikely to be
adopted, and would have substantial costs if they were. Rules allowing some
uses but not others are likely to be difficult to police. Technology controls
will work best if the technology is young and not yet widely deployed; but
that is the moment when both knowledge about the technology, and the
chance of public outrage and legislative action are minimal. As for the Cali-
fornia antipaparazzi statute, it only applies to private collection of sense-
enhanced data. It addresses either data collection by law enforcement nor
database issues.320 And, as noted, it does not apply to public spaces.
tivity does not include illegal or otherwise criminal activity as delineated in subdivision (f).
However, "personal and familial activity" shall include the activities of victims of crime in cir-
cumstances where either subdivision (a) or (b), or both, would apply.
318. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(a), (b) (2000):
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who intentionally-
(a) sends through the mail, or sends or carries in interstate or foreign commerce, any
electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of
such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications;,
(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic, mechanical, or other de-
vice, knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily use-
ful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications,
and that such device or any component thereof has been or will be sent through the mail or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
319. See Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application ofStatutes Relating to Burglars'
Tools, 33 A.L.R.3d 798 (1970 & Supp. 1999). ("Statutes making unlawful the possession of bur-
glars' tools or implements have been enacted in mostjurisdictions.").
320. For a criticism of these and other limitations, see Privacy, Teclnology, and the Califor-
nia "Anti-Paparazzi" Statute, supra note 198, at 1378-84.
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c. Classic data protection law.
The failure of self-regulation, and the difficulties with market-based ap-
proaches, have led regulators in Europe, and to a much lesser extent in the
United States, to craft data protection laws. Although European Union laws
are perhaps best known for their restrictions on data processing, reuse, or
resale of data, the Union's rules, as well as those of various European na-
tions, also contain specific limits on the collection of sensitive types of
data.32' European Union restrictions on data use have an extraterritorial di-
mension, in that they prohibit the export of data to countries that lack data
protection rules comparable to the Union's.22 These extraterritorial rules do
not, however, require that foreign data collection laws meet the Union's
standards, leaving the United States on its own to decide what protections, if
any, it should enact to safeguard its consumers and citizens.
So far, laws have been few and generally narrow, with the California
antipaparrazi statute a typical example. There is one sign, however, that
things may be starting to change: What may be the most important United
States' experiment with meaningful limits on personal data collection by the
private sector is about to begin. Late last year the FTC promulgated detailed
rules restricting the collection of data online from children under thirteen
without explicit parental consent. These rules are due to come into effect in
April, 2000.323
III. IS INFORMATION PRIVACY DEAD?
In The Transparent Society, futurist David Brin argues that the time for
privacy laws passed long before anyone noticed: "[1it is already far too late
to prevent the invasion of cameras and databases.... No matter how many
laws are passed, it will prove quite impossible to legislate away the new sur-
veillance tools and databases. They are here to stay."324 Instead, perhaps
anticipating smart dust, he suggests that the chief effect of privacy laws will
be "to 'make the bugs smaller."'325 He is equally pessimistic about technical
countermeasures to data acquisition, saying that "the resulting surveillance
arms race can hardly favor the 'little guy'. The rich, the powerful, police
agencies, and a technologically skilled elite will always have an advan-
321. See Mayer-Schainberger, supra note 311, at 232; SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERo, supra note
5.
322. See SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 5; SCHvARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 5.
323. See FTC Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (effective Apr.
21, 2000), (requiring parental consent prior to collection of information from children under thir-
teen).
324. BRIN, supra note 11, at 8-9.
325. Id. at 13.
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tage."326 Having concluded that privacy as we knew it is impossible, Brin
goes on to argue that the critical policy issue becomes whether citizens will
have access to the data inevitably enjoyed by elites. Only a policy of maxi-
mal shared transparency, one in which all state-created and most privately-
created personal data are equally accessible to everyone, can create the lib-
erty and accountability needed for a free society.
Brin's pessimism about the efficacy of privacy laws reflects the law's
weak response to the reality of rapidly increasing surveillance by both public
and private bodies described in Part L Current privacy laws in the United
States make up at best a thin patchwork, one that is plainly inadequate to
meet the challenge of new data acquisition technologies. General interna-
tional agreements that address the privacy issue are no better.327 Even the
vastly more elaborate privacy laws in Europe and Canada permit almost any
consensual collection and resale of personal data.328 The world leader in the
deployment of surveillance cameras, the United Kingdom, has some of the
strictest data protection rules in the world, but this has done little or nothing
to slow the cameras' spread. What is more, the law often tends to impose
barriers to privacy-enhancing technology, or to endorse and require various
forms of surveillance: In the words of one Canadian Information and Pri-
vacy Commissioner, "the pressures for surveillance are almost irresisti-
ble."329
Despite the very weak legal protections of informational privacy in the
United States today, there is an argument that Brin's pessimism about the
potential for law to control technology and Scott McNealy's defeatism are
unfounded, or at least premature. No legal rule is likely to be perfect. Laws
are violated all the time. But, making things illegal, or regulating them, does
influence outcomes, and sometimes the effort required to achieve those out-
comes is worth the cost.
326. Id.
327. International agreements to which the United States is a party speak in at least general
terms of rights to privacy. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the
United Nations in 1948, states that "[nlo one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence." G.A. Res. 217A (II), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No.
13, at 71, UN Doc. A1810 (1948) <http://www.hrweb.orgllegalludhr.html>. Similarly, Article 17 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March
23, 1976, art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 <http://www.unhchr.cb/html/menu3/b/a.ccpr.htm>.
Both agreements state that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."
328. Potentially invidious categories such as ethnicity are sometimes subject to special regu-
lation.
329. David H. Flaherty, Controlling Surveillance: Can Privacy Protection Be Made Effective,
in TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY, supra note 178, at 167, 170.
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Wiretap statutes are a case in point. It is illegal for the police to wiretap
telephone lines without a warrant, and it is illegal for third parties to intercept
both landline and cellular calls without the consent of one or both parties to
the call.330 It would be naive in the extreme to suggest that either of these
practices completely disappeared as a result of their illegality; it would be
equally wrong, though, to suggest that this demonstrates that the laws are
ineffective. If wiretapping and telephone eavesdropping were legal, and the
tools easily available in every hobby shop331 there would be much more
wiretapping and eavesdropping.
Even the drug war, which surely stands for the proposition that the law
has its limits as a tool of social control in a democracy, also supports the
proposition that law can sometimes change behavior. It also reminds us,
though, that law alone might not be enough. There are many different kinds
of laws, and command and control regulation is often the least effective op-
tion.332
The contrast between the wiretap laws and the drug war underline an-
other important element in any attempt to use law to reign in personal data
collection: Unless there is a mechanism that creates an incentive for some-
one to police for compliance, legal rules will have at best limited effective-
ness. 333 Policing of so-called victimless crimes such as drug usage is
hampered by the lack of such incentives. In contrast, the most important po-
licing of wiretap law is conducted by judges, who throw out illegally gath-
ered evidence in the course of reviewing petitions by highly motivated
defendants. In other cases, such as statutory damages for falsifying privacy
policies,334 the law can create or reinforce economic incentives for policing
compliance.
At least one other contrast shapes and constrains any attempt to craft new
legal responses to privacy-destroying technology. As the contrast between
Parts I and II of this paper demonstrates, our legal categories for thinking
about data collection are the product of a radically different evolution from
the technological arms race that produces new ways of capturing informa-
tion. Privacy-destroying technologies do not line up particularly well with
the legal rules that govern them. This explains why the United States Con-
stitution is unlikely to be the source of a great expansion in informational
330. Some states require consent of both parties, some just one.
331. In the case of analog cellular phones, the tools are available in most Radio Shacks, al-
though they require slight modification. See RICH WELLS, RADIO SHACK PRO-26 REVIEw <http'/.
www.durhamradio.calpro26r.htm>; cf Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(describing the use of a scanner to eavesdrop).
332. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Anerican Admitistrative Law, 88
HARV. L. RV. 1667 (1975).
333. See Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY, supra
note 293, at 193, 214-15.
334. See text following note 288 supra.
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privacy rights. The Constitution does not speak of privacy, much less infor-
mational privacy. Even though the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
"there is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual,"335 the data con-
tours of that "zone" are murky indeed. The Supreme Court's relatively few
discussions of informational privacy tend to be either in dicta or in the con-
text of finding other interests more important,336 or both.337 Similarly, fa-
miliar constitutional categories such as public forums, limited public forums,
and nonpublic forums map poorly on future debates about how to create or
protect zones of privacy against privacy-destroying technologies.
The variety of potential uses and users of data frustrate any holistic at-
tempt to protect data privacy. Again, constitutional doctrine is illustrative.
Whatever right to informational privacy may exist today, it is a right against
governmentally sponsored invasions of privacy only-it does not reach pri-
vate conduct.338 Thus, even if the courts were to find in the federal Constitu-
tion a more robust informational privacy right, it would address only a
portion of the problem.339
335. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975); see also Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (describing how the Third and Ninth Amendments create
"zones ofprivacy").
336. E.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) (suggesting that
the former President has a privacy interest in his papers). In Whalen, the Court accepted that the
right to privacy includes a generalized "right to be let alone," which includes "the individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.' Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (finding that
whatever privacy interest exists for patients in information about their prescriptions was insufficient
to overcome the compelling state interest).
337. The leading counterexample to this assertion is United States Dept. ofJustice v. Report-
ers Comn.for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), in which the Supreme Court held that there
was a heightened privacy interest in an FBI compilation of otherwise public information sufficient
to overcome an FOIA application. Even if the data contained in a "rap sheet" were available in
public records located in scattered courthouses, the compilation itself, the "computerized summary
located in a single clearinghouse" was not Id. at 764.
338. Other than its direct prohibition of slavery, the United States Constitution does not di-
rectly regulate private conduct.
Some state constitutions' privacy provisions also apply only to the government. For example,
the Florida constitution provides that "[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein.
This section shall not be construed to limit the publie's right of access to public records and meet-
ings as provided by law," FLA. CONST. art L, § 23, but this does not apply to private actors. See
Hon. Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in Florida in the Age of Tech-
nology and the Twenty-first Century: A Need for Protection from Private and Commercial Intnt-
sion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 53 (1997).
339. Some state constitutions go further. Compare State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (NJ. 1982)
(holding that the New Jersey state constitution creates a protectable privacy interest in telephone
billing records), with United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and California Bankers Assn. v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (finding no such right in the Federal Constitution).
In 1972 the people of the State of California adopted a ballot initiative recognizing an "inal-
ienable right" to "privacy". "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and pro-
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Rules about data acquisition, retention, and use that might work for nosy
neighbors, merchants, or credit bureaus might not be appropriate when ap-
plied to intelligence agencies. Conversely, governments may have access to
information or technology that the private sector lacks today but might obtain
tomorrow; rules that focus too narrowly on specific uses or users are doomed
to lag behind technology. Restricting one's scope (as I have in this article) to
data acquisition, and leaving aside the important issues of data retention and
reuse, may make the problem more manageable, but even so it remains
dauntingly complex because the regulation of a single technology tends to be
framed in different ways depending upon the context. Sense-enhanced
searches, for example, tend to be treated as Fourth Amendment issues when
conducted by the government. If the intruder is private, the Fourth Amend-
ment is irrelevant. Instead, one might have to consider whether her actions
constitute an invasive tort of some type (or perhaps even a misappropriation
of information), who owns the information, and whether a proposed rule
limiting the acquisition or publication of the information might run afoul of
the First Amendment.340
That said, technological change has not yet moved so far or so quickly as
to make legal approaches to privacy protection irrelevant. There is much the
law can do, only a little of which has yet been tried. Many of the suggestions
outlined above are piecemeal, preliminary, or incremental. At best they form
only part of a more general strategy, which will also focus on encouraging
the adoption of fair information practices and the regulation of data use once
it has been collected. Whenever the law can address the issue of data collec-
tion itself, however, it reduces the pressure on data protection law and con-
tributes greatly to data privacy protection; the converse is also true: Rules
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ I.
In 1994 the California Supreme Court held that the 1972 privacy initiative created a right of
action against private actors as well as the government. See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994). Although it described informational privacy as the "core
value furthered by the Privacy Initiative," the court also listed several conditions that would have to
be met before a claim asserting that right could succeed. A plaimtiff must show: (1) that the public
or private defendant is infringing on a "legally protected privacy interesf'--which in the case of
informational privacy means an individual's right to prevent the "dissemination or misuse of sensi-
tive and confidential information"; (2) a "reasonable expectation of privacy" based on "an objective
entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms"; and (3) a "serious
invasion" of privacy by the defendant. Id. at 654-55. Even then, the court stated that privacy
claims must be balanced against countervailing interests asserted by the defendant. Id. at 653.
340. Some issues are common to both public and private contexts: for example, whether the
subject enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy. Even if the question is the same, however, the
answer may be different. Generally the same technology initially raises distinct issues in the two
contexts, at least until the information is sold, although this too may create its own special issues.
Cf United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 752-53, 762-63, 780 (1989) (holding that the FBI could not release criminal rap sheet consist-
ing predominately of information elsewhere on public record when disclosure would invade sub-
ject's privacy).
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about data retention and use will shape what is collected and how it is
done.341
There is no magic bullet, no panacea. If the privacy pessimists are to be
proved wrong, the great diversity of new privacy-destroying technologies
will have to be met with a legal and social response that is at least as subtle
and multifaceted as the technological challenge. Given the rapid pace at
which privacy-destroying technologies are being invented and deployed, a
legal response must come soon, or it will indeed be too late.
341. The line of cases beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
is a good example of this phenomenon. Case law defining the circumstances in which a publisher
could defend itself against a charge of libel-a problem of data use-generates a set of rules and
procedures defining data collection actions that reporters must obey in order to be able to prove
they complied with basic norms of due care.
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